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OVERVIE\'/ OF DBT.ERRENCE 
1. The 1\ins is Dead • . • 
The United States is toda:r involved in the poli-
ties of nearly every nation on the face of the globe. We 
have economic dee.lings with _E~.: .. We have soldiers and 
sailors stationed seemingly everyr1here. Our foreign aid 
commitments are enormous. Wars bet1:een 1'ourth-rate powers 
thousnnds of miles away ensnarl us inextricably. Our 
State - J.2eJ?artment numbers thousands and our defense budget 
is the world 1 s lnrgest. Cries of American imperialism 
are sounded by peoples most Americans have never heard of. 
And through it all ne see ourselves as innocents nho want I. / ~ l 1• 
nothing from anyone else. How can this be? Perhaps th~ . _\,. : i: :<·:'-''\ 
leaders l~ow something the people don 1 t 1 yet even they J ·.: · . . 1 ' 
seem unable to create a coherent foreign policy. V/hy 
.......... ; ~ . t ;·-
• { • i .. ' . •-
. .... . 
. . ~ .. 
. - . . . ,• ... \ \ . 
\ . ' • ·t. ~ ' 
does the richest and most po11er.ful nation on earth stand i :·;··: .. _. .. ~ · · 
I ) i·: · F" . 
in the international arena a confused and muddled child?.· \' 
This situation achieves paradox as one remembers 
that since the Tery beginning of her national existence 
the United States has sought to avoid foreign political 
l 1i/ involTement. ~~has e.llfays tranted comrnercicl inter-
course but strictly without political alliance or 
i See Felix Gilbert, The Beginnin~ of American 
Foreie Policy: To the FareY;ell ~C.dre ss ( Ke11 York: 
1963). 
0 
responsibility. In previous days the yo~~g and relatiYely 
Treak Republic •ms able to achieve these objectives due to 
her orm 5e ographica.l position end t~e fortunate st1"uc tur.e 
of the international system follouing the Hapoleonic Wars. 
While the A.~ericans ne!yely attributed their success to a 
mora 1 superiori t:r of their political system, the poi1er 
structure of the 19th century developed in such a manner 
as to indulge the Republic·' s existence. The international 
system was a balance of rival poners 11ith G1•ee.t Britain 
the fulcrum. It was only the coincidence of British and 
American interests that allowed the Republic her innocent 
2 
security. But thl.•ough growth, childhood ends. 
With grottth of American poTrer came grol7th in her 
foreign 1nterests and a series of ~entures into the inter-
nationa l political arena. The first was her enforcement 
of the l.ionroe Doctrine after the Ci\.~ il \7ar. But A .. rneri ca 
soon found such ventures es the Spanish-American War 
brousht Tii th them international commitments and this she 
did not Yiant. She developed a pattern the re fore of 
reluctance to become .involved in .the co~nity of nations. 
If involvement -r;as unav-oidable , ._ as_ in World .. Vfar I, she 
I 
would sally forth as to a crusaee, but the minute the con-
£lict ended would retreat behind her oceans determined 
neTer again to become "entansled." She did not v.·ant and 
would not accept e long-term international role. 
· 2George !Cesnne.n, American D:!.plomac:v 1900-1950 





This pattern, hor.ever, was not to endure. The 
g1•cat rrars r:ere to destroy th c international system .f1,om 
~hich tl1e United States had so long derived her security. 
First, the technological revolution in rreaponry, which 
vastly inc1~eased the cost of war in both humen and materi-
al destruction, 2lso rendered America vulnerable to attack 
3 from abroad as she had l1ever been be.fore. Second, Great 
Britain, leoder of' the interne.tional system, fulcrum of 
the balance, fell. 
Great empires do not fall in a day. It is dif.fi-
cult to determine uhen the British Empire ceased to be 
the effective leader of the internationel system. During 
the First Vlorld War the Eri tish themselves must have 
realized thei1, dependence on the United States. During 
the period cf the Lee.&ue of Nations, Britain end other 
_ ..... -
European countries looked to the United States for assist-
ance. HoT1ever, in the years follor.ing 1914 the United 
States had attempted to avoid political commitment. Even 
her entrance into World War I, surrounded as it 1;as uith 
great moral fervo,r, Ties repudiated at the. r;ar 1 s end. The 
American record for the decades ·between the -Wo:rild . War.s. 
nas one of avoidance, moralism, end parochialism. Even 
at the end of the Second World '/lar the Americans seemed 
to have retained a belief in the return of normalcy. 
However in 1945 the international system lay in ruins. 
York: 
3Ra:pnond . Aron, The Century of Total War (New 
1959J. 
3 
The fall of Great Britain es the leader of the world 
had consequences for the United States. The King rms dead! 
Someone ·•;ould ha7e to take his pli;.ce--immediately! There 
Ti'e.s created not only a poi1er· vacuum, but e leadership 
vacuum. The responsibility that had for so long been 
shouldered by Britain norr fell to a young nation 1rith 
little ezperience in diploma cy end less enthusiasm for 
its intrigues. 
_, .~-:· 11:···~ The America being offered the scepter 'ras an 
v. '/(•1- ·· -
. ~ ... - ; 0 1 , .. ~-· - ·- ---.. 
l I ? { ' / 1 , ~ .... '!~ . ,~. , . adolescent nution nith a folklore of idealism end naivete 
,.,,..;11,•· · · . .... :,: '-.......... __ _ ... - •• . - -
•• ~ •• J • • • • ~·'-·' - • • 
1 •• , ,. . ~ ' ·"1 •  
' l :, ' • l ~ o • I f ; ....  ,,._.. ~ ,,._L 
.11· ·~ · ,'I... 1 
.. . 
... t' t .: . \ ._,. 
~ .... . \ ':. l ~ 
j I l.1 I '· 
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which projected the realities of the external rrnrld in 
ter~s of American desires. 4 The American nation forced 
into a position of ~orld leodership and responsibility 
t· 
assumed the task_ not rd th the clari;t"Y and ene1•g:r so 
characteristic of her spirit engaging domestic chal-
.,..,, 
~/J•'·' !. ' I , .. ,. l i ( 1 ; ,o;, }rt•·· lenges. Rather, the Americans assumed their responsi-
0 
bility as a burden and attended it with hal.f-truths, .) 1~£~.~~.1:;,;·i: 
l< "'( ..... '" 
deceptions, and the general doggish behaTior character- J 
istic of a defeated nation. Only the unsettling pres-
ence of the Soviet Union as the single other rorce le.ft 
standing on the field moved, the Americans to accept the 
responsibility ot per.er. That the generation of policy 
makers oi' the late forties and fifties oTerextended the 
resources of the United States and overcommitted the 
nation is not surprising giTen the tradition ot 
4Henr1 May, The End of American Innocence 
(Chicago: 1962). 
isolationism and the shock of eni'orced commitment. 
2. '.lhe Arnerice.n Burden 
Mei.ny factors in the history and culture of the 
nation made the new leadership role more difficult for 
the United States. Among these factors were: her 
political institutions and the belief systems underly-
ing them, the lock of operational foreign policy objec-
tives, the demends of the domestic sector for larger 
resource allocations, and experiences of extremism, 
hysteria, and poor leadership in periods of national 
crisis. 
The demands of internationel leadership put a 
strain.u~on A.~erican institutions bec~use the folklore 
o:f the American poli tica.l tradition ens'b..rined limited 
government and '\''leak executive euthori t:r. With each 
great crisis this sacred tenet hed to be laid aside 
while centralization of porrnr in the federal executive 
took place. After the crisis passed most, but not all, 
of the power reverted to the states or people. However 
·~ 
the lack or a cleer apportioning of poner among the 
I 
three brenche·s of the federal and betrleen federal end 
state governments bas ma·de lor:g-term planning end 
immediate action difficult. One congressional com-
mittee has noted of the confusion: 
Recent international eTents haye reemphasized 
the importanc·e of cooperation betrreen the execu-
tive and legislative branches of our GoTernment 
in' matters affecting r.ational security. Disputes 
between Congress end the President over the proper 
exercise of the war po~ers can only rreaken the 






A proper apportioning of the war poners proved 
to be the mos t complex an d pe rplexing problem with 
which the subcqmmittee has ye t to be concerned. 
Tbe issue is rooted in the c on s titutional system 
devised by the F0unding Pathers in ?hiledelphia 
almost 200 ye ars ego ; at the s ame time , it is an 
issue which ha s gre nt importan c e for the safet,Y 
and survival o:f ou1 .. Nation in the nucle er age.> 
The separation of power among di:ffe1•ent branches 
answering to different constituents does not constitute 
the onlj institutional problem for Arnericen leadership. 
The :frequency of scheduled elections often brings the 
machinery of government to virtuel standstill for several 
months or reduces the credibility of the edrninistration 
in poTier. 
It is the democratic dogma i tseli' Y1hich renders 
the Am~r.ican executive y:eak end the electoral process so 
disruptive of foreign policy leedership. Democracy in 
America may, or may not be a poI.itical-cultural reality. 
It is an article of faith, howeTer. The majority of the 
people belieye in the existence or democracy and in 
their rights and privileges as free men. Rather early 
in the Republic's existence democracy became defined 
in terms of the Jacksonian persuasion. Equality was 
generalized to include leadership and the idea that gov-
ernment was within the capability of all men. Most 
Americans belieTe they csn understand the complexities 
5Hearings before the Subcomr.iittee on National 
Security Policy and Sc~entific DeYelopments . Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs. House of RepresentatiTes. 
9lst Congress, Second Session. Con~ress, The Presi-





of foreign policy. But, underst~nd or not they believe 
that the people ha~e a ri&ht to lmon nhat is going on in 
for0ign affairs and ultimate ly o right to pass judgment 
on the deci3ions of the policy makers. This belief' sys-
tem, the existence of an amazinglr free press and mass 
media, and frequent elections have given American public 
opinion great political po~er. In the United States for-
eign policy is carried on under the glare of public / 
Th lt . tl t th . . hi t 1 ·~ f:'i1.rtl ezposure. e resu is 1 a ose in power, \'1l.S ng o -i:i.·i..(;.-..i.' 
remain there, produce pious, sentimental, unrealistic, 
and often untrue statements based on what they think the 
people want to hear. Those out of poner, wishing to get 
in, reply uith a constant barrage of vitriolic rhetoric, 
equally unrealis_tic llnd untrue, based on what the:r think 
the people want. The result is the goals or policy are 
com~romised--and often lost track ot altoscther in the 
political fray. Occasionally the government resorts to 
duplicity, saying one thing Ylhile doing another. 
While this is not an unusual practice throughout 
the uorld, in the Uni.ted States the disco_verJ" or a "cred-
ibili t:r. gap n ce.n lead to a paralysis of leadership and 
loss of popular confidence in government. The last years 
of the Johnson administration perfectly exemplifj this. 
'Ihe dilemma or democracy is that its real Talue lies not 
in efficiency but in .freedom nhile world leadership 
requires efficient, decisiTe action. 
1. ·I ,·f. 
0 The burden of Trorld leadership is els o an economic 




then be used in other areas uhich yield greeter social 
value et home. nliow many hospitals is one ne'r aircraft 
currier l1orth? 11 This kind of quest ion from the uloyal 11 
opposition, being loaded, is difficult to ansuer. Yet 
the people 1;ait for the reply. Defense spending is 
decidedly unpopular in the United States. In recent 
years we have experienced the emergence of anti-var, 
anti-defense move1~ents. \',hile differing in appeal and 
approach these movements largel7 agree that the de.fense 
ef.forts of the United States are contrar:r to the national 
interest. Some argue that resources used in defense are 
more immediately needed in the cities; others argue that 
thcn~e - is no threat eAcept that Tthich the United States 
creates; and atill others look for the conspiracies of 
t · ,·,! ~··, ... 
a "complex. 11 This idea ot a pro:fit tlotive as a prime 
determinant of :foreign and defense policy go~s back at 
least to the Spanish-American \"/ar. Then the quest .for 
the Chine trade \res seen as the real reason for Juner- -1 ! 
ica' s annexation of the ?hilippines end the construc~-):./·JOiLt, t· 
of the Great White Fleet. During the First V.1orld Vlar J ~ t ~ 
the munitions makers were the_ culprits. Their desire 
to sell arms ue.s the "real" reason for the Great carn-
age. The Second World War brought a more sophisticated 
cynicism. The uar profiteer with his cost-plus contract 
nas a favorite target of the polemicists. The Korean 
War r.as explained as a "cure" for an economic depression. 
The popularity o.f this reverse yellow jo~nelism is an 
instance of the problems of modern American foreign and 







defense policy. This anti-defense posture arose periodi-
cally in the post, generally after an American venture 
into world politics. In lar•ge part it gene1~a t:)d the iso-
lationism recu1•rent :.n Amer•ican history. The critics o!' 
defense spending fell silent as the crisis ended and 
defense spending ceased. Today, hor,ever, the crisis does 
not end. World leadership is not a sporadic activity. 
The period of the Cold Viar has been e period of neither 
war nor peace. The American people, who are quite good 
at getting 11 up 11 for a particular confrontation, do not 
adjust Y:ell to chronic crisis. Today, therefore, 11hile 
d~fense is ever more expensive, the people are ever less 
tol~rP:,nt of it. There are so many areas \•;here spending 
9 
would be positive. Domestic poverty, crime, drug abuse, i 
cancer, urben development, ecology all have a positive b ,J,t.C.1~ 
1 ~ I ,7•J· appea • "'"'.t- f ·"/. ! " lj 0.. • r•I '" 'J:'hus the elected officials, executive snd legis- -.t~ 1 \I~-\· '.I (Ul /l la ti ve, are challenged by the dilemma of meeting ever 0 ,· r c~t.i . ..f 
r ~- "' • ; , 
h r f A/ •) J tl '· • more expensive defense requests in t e ace o an ever ,~ '"" · 
trLV• - / '-
c r.r .- r,, ,__ d . 1 tit Tl1e result i·s to [1.i.v· f, more ise.pprov ng. cons uency. -
frrr· j~ Ii ' attempt to achieve adequate t defense cheaply. This gen- ·' 1 1 t-¥. f. l ~ . 
erell y has meant funding those r:eepons systems t.· \ ~·-t cl,._.! 
" ,_,. . 'f' t •• ;µv 
111.t l.e·~ 
6 / 
The literature on the economics of defense is 
vast. 0!' recent vintage see Richard J. Barnet, The 
Economy of Death (!-Tew York: 1970), Leonard Lewen, 
Reoort from Iron r.:ountr:in (Nevi York: 1967) Seymour 
Me lnan, .£-cntsron G& oi-: slism (~~eY: York: 1970), T.ristrom 
Coffin, The . .;r;::cC. S::>ciety {Baltimore: 1964), Fred J. 
Cook, The ·:.srfe:.re State {NeiY York: 1962), and Adam 
Yermelinsky, 1'he J.:ilitar:r Establishment (Nen York: 1971). 
0 
delivering the greatest punch at least oxponse. It has 
also meant that def~nse strategy has been determined by 
economic ~tringoncy rather than national inte1•e s t or mil-
i t ~ry logic. Tnus r re have played conn the maintenance of 
viable conventional force s , r.hich are expensive end 
unpopular, and substituted nuclear capability, in turn 
triggering the nuclear a1•ms race. Whether this is in 
10 
our nstional or world best inte~est is cer~ainly- pebat- . DJ : 
f '- i • 1 j\V .. -· / ·'1 ·· : «·.,-. 
able. /Yo make the nuclear scept~r more palatab~.j3-- /'.·"''J)~~~.J 
\_ _ _...· \ ,,./ I 
and to give it some semblance of rat ionali ty_.we have 
developed as the cornerstone of our defense posture the 
concept of deterrence.:? But economy, not long-term 
best ~nterest has been the primar1 concern. 
Defense planning th~refore b ecomes en ad hoc 
result of budgetary considerations coupled nith 
political-adrr~nistrative compromises and partisan pol-
itics. Under these concitions the difficulty of obtain-
ing a rational defense or foreign policy becomes clear. 
~--· 
Completing the circle·, the lack of load.ers~ip has ineant 
that Americans have been unclear · as to their Tital or 
national interests and the:Lr. role in the world . Thus 
......._ ---
long-range objectives heve been ebsent from policy dee-
-isions giving American policy its ad hoc defensive and 
essentially weak nature. 
3. Ad Hoc Macro Str~tegy 
Operating as a mejor pouer in the international 




is a complex and highly danGer ous enterpr is e . It is the 
unfortunate circums t ance tha t the previously discussed 
di ff icul ties inherent in the /.Jner·ican sys t om are com-
pounded by the pres ent n a ture of the INS. That the com-
bination has not ye t proYed fatal to all should inspire 
one Yd th great res pe e t for the men r;ho have thus fa1 .. 
successfully strugs led under the burden. 
The INS is a "s ys tem" in the t e chnical sense in 
that (1) it is composed of s eparate but interrelated 
elements (nations) that (2) have observable relation-
ships which exist over time. 7 The pos i tion of eny nation 
in the sys tern i .s determined by its po7;er. Power in this 
. 
situation .. offers not only to mill t ary porrer, but many 
other fa~tors ~uch as influence, alliances, economic 
base, resources, qualitJ of le a de rship, strength or 
e.xecutiYe office, qualit:r of popula t i on, standard or 
living, etc. The extent of a nation 1 s s overeignty, 
i.e. the range of freedom it has in movil}g_ t_o)1ard its ·· 
.. ,,-·  ·7-, 
perceived intGrests, is a function of its position in 
\ _,,./ 
the system. Thus to .a great extent pos' t t1:ondeterminas 
-. 
action and reaction. It rrould be as erroneous to 
assume complete conformity to the above principles as 
it would be to dismiss e.ny regularity or sys ternic 
behavior. 
·,· 
The current structure of the Il~S may be 
. 
7i~orton Kaplan, STstem end Process in Inter-
national Relations (Nev York: 1960). 
l : 
0 
described as looselj bi-polar ~ith the United States and 
the USSR occupying the polar positions of superpowers. 
Grouped around those two are their allies. Finally there 
ere core or less independent clusters of nations uhose 
poTier is largely potential. 
The system is governe d by tho interplaj of the 
self-interests of the c omponent actors, a situation not 
unlike the I.~adisonian model. Overriding this conflict 
of self-interests is the generalized survival interest 
of the entire system. This interest demands the avoid-
ance of spasmodic nuclear war. All actions and reec-
tions of the great poY1ers are weighed against this objec-
tive. Spasmodic nuclear i/ar is to be avoided because the 
weapons of mass C.estruc ti on and counter¥alue employment 
strategies would render no gain, no Tic tors. lliat the 
avoidance of nuclear war is a norm of the INS ~as demon-
strated by the options chosun b:r both the United States 
and th~ USSR in Cuba, by the United States in Korea and 
Vietnam, end b:r the United States and USSR in the Middle 
East. 
The INS can provide
1 
a sense of security as long 
as the range and scope of disputes among the gre2t powers 
is "rnanaged. 11 That is, as long as conflict is not 
alloned to escalate to the point of so threatenir..g the 
Yital interests ot a major power that the employment 0£ 
nuclear r.eapons becomes a feasible option. In order to 
aToid that point each nation must understand what _the 







act rationally 5nd predictobly in ~ction ~ntl reuction. 
Opposition may be deter~ined, but must also be meneged. 
State::; :.iust know 11 ho"."l far they cc.n push" or 1rhen to 
threaten end when to Tiithdr&.w. The leaders of •1arious 
blocs in the system must be particularly adept at this 
kind of 11game. 11 The United States is an insecure ele-
ment in this system for severa!. historic ::.nd political 
reasons. Her rejection of int&rnstional involvc~ent in 
the past has riven her a lack of experience in the 
field. We a.re not -:;ery adept at the game. Furthermo1•e 
the quixotic nature of our politics prevents our having 
a clear set of perceived vital interests !or t3e ether 
side to respect and avoid. Our ectiong therefore are 
unpredi~table and eTen seeminglr irrational. An ad hoc 
i: 
foreign policy proTides _no 
side mar rationally plan. 
cuidolines br r:hich the other _. 
,. I 
from exe.c tly this kind of 
The Korean conflict resulted J- eu ~.~J.t.-~·t . .' 
mi scelculation. j 
Nor.here is the ad hoc nature of our mecro-
stra_tegy more a ppe.re:nt than in our adopt ion ot the 
deterrence concept as the corner~tone of our foreisn 
and defense policy. 
Deterrence is the abilitJ to influence someone 
not to do so~ething. .?ositively, it is persuasion. 
NegatiTely, it is threat. Deterrence has become the 
major element in stretegic planning since 1945. It 
existed prior to 1945. However, r.ith the develop~ent 
of nuclear weapons, deterrence has become the most 





environment. It is important to noto at the onset that 
deterrence is not a thir.g or a stage to be achieved, 
ratter it is en on-going process. It is dynamic and 
relative. A stable deterrent is one 't':hich relates to 
time and to a specific situational context. Thus even 
in the definitional stage deterrence policy must be 
formulated in terms of specific events and charecteris-
tics. Those include: the current power structure of 
the international system, the state of neapon tech-
nology, and the perception of each important actor o:f 
its or.n interonts, objectives, snd power and of its 
adversary's interests, objectives, and power. Neu 
pol~t!cal adherents, shifts in the international belance 
of po-.:er, change.s in leadership, and many other factors 
may affect the viability of a deterrence strategy. 
Essentially deterrence is political in that it 
attempts to ini'luence or control another actor. One 
usually thinl~s of deterrence in negative terms, that is, 
it usually se~ks to prevent a given act. Pr~vention of 
an act requires po~er, hence the -study o:f deterrence is 
a .form of pm-;er analysis·- Per.er . m.e.y b.e ove!'t or. covert, 
real or potential as loi;ig as it can perform the ect o.f 
influence it is an object of consideration. 
Though power is the substence behind deter~ence 
its actual use in armed coni'lict means that deterrence 
· 
8Georbe E. Quester, Deterrence before Hiroshima 
(l~en York: 1966) • 
hes failed. While deterrenc~ depends upon the ez:is tence 
or perceived ez:istence or poner in order to ru.,ction as 
part of a netion1 s strategy, the extent that the po~er 
is ever used it beco~es dysfunctional. Thus in deterrence 
the applice.tion of poner is limited to th1~eat. 
Threat analy~is constitutes a large part of the 
study of deterrence. The threat ~u~t be credible, and 
must be able to influence the otr ..er actor by fear of pun-
ishncnt ror a given act or by fear of failure in a given 
ur.dertaking. Glenn Snyder refers to this es deterrence 
by denial and punishment. 9 
Much :.nformation must be compiled before a cal-
cula.tecl.deterrcnce policy csn be reached. First, there 
must be a statenent of one 1 s o~n national interests, 
including a list or national priorities, i.e. Trhet inter-
·ests must be protected at r:hat costs and r:he.t objectives 
may be pursued at nhat costs. Second, there must be an 
inventc~y of n~t~on~l power in both ebsolute and rela-
tive terns; i.e. \\'hat do r1e have? end r.·ha.t vrould r1e be 
iiilling to use in e given si tua.tion? In other words 
list number tno must be correlated nitn-list_number one. 
fuis correlation is similar to "cost-benerit analysis 11 
end is extremely difficult. Is the seizlU'e or en A.~er­
ican rishing boat ~orth a thermonucleer ez:change, a lim-
ited conventional wer, a diplomatic crisis, an economic 
9Glenn li. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial end Pun-




boycott, or merely a note of protest? \'/as the placement 
or Russian missiles in Cuba in 1962 worth a. protest note 
or Trn.r? 
This is only one-third of the picture. Any 
deterrence policy ~~11 also be influenced by a calcula-
tion of the edversary's military and econor.rl.c interests, 
its pOloer, and its cost-ber.ei'it analysis. Vl'nat were the 
Russian missiles in Cuba worth to the Russians? A pro-
test note from the American embassy? Surely. A thermo-
nuclear exchange? No. 
Tne third piece of the puzzle is perhaps the 
most crucial. It is also the most vulnereble to miscal-
culation. This Day be called the adversery's perception 
l 
,. fi , ....... 
of our -threat credibility. In other 'l"iords what do thex .) ,: · ! y..,; 
t~ •. ~-.. 
think ~ think? or What did the Russians believe ther~ 
\.{.".l ;.. 
1nissiles in Cube.-v::ere worth to the Americans? Were they 
rrnrth a therraonuclear exchange to us? This is the crux 
of threet credibility. The adversary must believe that 
r.e will cerry out our threats. If we ~ere to threaten 
a thernonuclear r~sponse to a fishing boat seizure the 
adversary TI'ould be unlikely to believe· it·; The credi-
bility of the threat would be low and thus it would not 
function as a deterrent. While it may be possible to 
bluf'f in this gamo, doing so and getting caught reduces 
the credibility end deterrent value of all future 
threats. It also increases the den£er or future mis-
calculation by the adversary and the necessity of our 




Deterrence dopcnds on e~pe cted behavior. 
nation must knovr -r.·hat to expect from the other. 
here that the United Stete s becomes an uns table 
in the IN'S. Other notions co not knoTT r;hat to expect 
froni us. An ed hoc :foreign policy makes prediction C\,_ 
nearly impossible. Often our reections come as complete~ 
surprises to our allies and adversaries alike. Surprise 
is not an adventage except in Tler, end it is nar we are 
trying to avoid. 
Within this i'ranework or deterrence there are 
still nany questions to be ans v1ered before one arrives 
at a specific deterrence policy. The literature in the 
i'ield o~ aeterrence theory usually divides de terrence 
into types, rinito vs. minirnUl:l deterrence, counter i'orce 
vs. counter value, deliberate, selective, and controlled 
response, mutual doomsday strategy, and the like. I 
would rather speak to tlie scope of de terre nce. What 
level or degree of threet do you v.·ish to issue? Put 
another way, how much do you thre~ten to destroy in 
order to deter? This concept or scope or deterrence 
' 
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is meant to carry on the idea or process mld relativ- Jc.. CJ-~::::~- -, ~ . 
ity in the strategic context. The scope of the threat] >· · · :\r ,~t·': \ ·r 
rnust fit the context. It must be a function of the 
value of the objective, the cost or risk of the engage-
ment, and the analysis of the adversary's vital needs 
and intentions as well as his capabilities. Deterrence, 
then, is a strategy, a plan, or design to attain or 
. t \ ~ -. 




prevent another rrom atta ining, certain objectives. It is 
a plan Yihich must constantly chance, v:hich is subject to 
feedback from many sources. Even if Y1e assume for a mom-
ent that our threats are credible, i.e. that the adversary 
believes us, \•:e must still decide what level of threat to 
present. Up to the present time ~e have deterred by use 
of nuclear threat. This is effective in major confronta-
tions. Tnat level of threat is ins.ppropria te and there-
i'ore useless in minor confrontations. \':e have avoided 
nuclear war, but ·we did not deter North l~orea or North 
Vietnam from carrying out their objectives. 
4. Counter Value 
- _Americans tend to believe in answers. They seek 
total solutions to problems and rarely have they been 
disappointed. Success is en essential component of the 
national epistemology. \'/ith the advent of the Cold War 
that has · changed. 
The constant ~ear and frustration of the Cold 
War, especially since the Soviet's achievement of 
. -
nuclear parity, has led many Americans to grasp at 
• 
simple, helf-wey solutions. The maintenance of a cred-
ible, rational deterrent is taxing on both the resources 
and the collective mind of the Republic. In seeking a 
less complex and less espensive solution to the problem 
of deterrence some Americans have found comfort in the 
"counter value strategy." While seemingly stable, and 
relatively inexpensive the counter value strategy 
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constitutes a dangerous option. 
Generally a counter value stra tegy may be defined 
as a plan of action which calls for the destruction of 
elements valued by the enemy, e.g. citi es, people, etc. 
In this si tue ti on des true ti on would be ordered without 
regnrd to ~ilitary significa~ce or l ong-term national 
objectives. Herman Kahn hes c ~lled this a spasmodic 
war. It could begin with a city trade-off and continue 
with sreat rapidity until all the cities, on both sides, 
are destroyed. Counter value springs from emotional 
depths, from desires of vengeance, ar.d from anger. The 
counter value strategist looks at those things the 
enemy valuen as hostaFes. The existence of these hos-
tages is therefo~e a guarantee of security. And the 
threat of their destruction is a deterrent. 
There are several variations of general counter 
value theory. Surely the most extreme is the doomsday 
concept. The logic, intent, and results are the same 
if one employs a general counter value strategy or a 
more specific, sp~cialized doomsday, · stre~egy. The 
difference is that . ~he~iatt~r is an automatic end 
instant response \";herees the former begins with a 
deliberate decision to inflict pain or to seek venge-
ance and then increases the tempo of destruction. 
Both strategies accept the destructive limit or nuclear 
V1eapons technology without question or control. The 
limit or the '\':eapons will be the l:!.rait of the war, 





str~tegies in gener~l or doomsday in particular do not 
atte1:1i)t to relate the type and level of destruction to 
the objectives of the state . Eucan reason seems to 
abclicate to tte force of sbce;r enert;y. 
A second variant of the general counter value 
st1•ategy is the LO:'/ concept (launch on wernir.g). ~ssen-
tially this strategy atte~pts to deter an adversery from 
launching a first strike by planning to launch insta:itly 
in the event that enemy missiles are detected by radar. 
ThE) cur1•ent apprehension over the Soviet SS-9 missile 
\':it!~ ever decreasing CEP ond y;ith e. MIRV confii;uretion 
has led many responsible .American leaders to seriously 
cons~d~r the LOW strategy. Men like Senators Fulbright, 
Symington, and Albert Gore have advanced t his argu;nent. 
In J.!arch 1969 Senator Fulbrit;ht stated: 
It vmuld sec!-:: to me the assurance, the 
kno,·;lede;e, that these ICBI.i's, even part of 
them, ~ould be released inwe diately • • • 
even \'.'i th out as1:ir.g the corr.put er ;·:hat to do, 
~ould be the greatest deterrence in the 
WOl"ld.10 
For Senator fulbright, like many other Americans, the 
LO\'/ strategy is very appealing "becaus~ it appears to 
ofi'er en inexpensive way of sidestepping the problem 
of tecb.nological change ·end of ignoring the growing 
strength of the Soviet Iilissile forces. 1111 This appeal 
10
:i.uthori.z&t::::m far ?.:11itary ?rocurement: 
He arint: before the Cor;.:~ :. t-:e:e on Ar:;ed Services, 
li. s. S1:1nate l.:arch 1970, "Tr~e ?roposal to L=.t:nch on 
Warning, 11 Paul \'!. Wafa•·litz, p . 2278. U. S. Government 






is, ho\·;t.:;·; er, ~upc1•ficial and misleading. It is an attempt 
to escape com-;ile.xity and settle the issue once and for 
all. Tl:e ;;robler,1 cf commi ttint; the n~ t.:. on to this option 
is that counter vnlue stra teg :!. es are extrer.:cly dr:ngerous. 
{l) Th~ir over-reactive n~ture r eakens the credibility o:r · 
the deterrent and thus they e.re provocative. ( 2) They do 
not take into accoui1t chanses in \'1eapons technology ,.:hich 
could deny hostages to one side . For exam;:>le, it is 
not inconceivablo that a damage limiting force be devel-
oped by eithei~ side in the next t\':o decades. ( 3) Counter 
value strategies do not account for accidents or for lim-
ited nuclea1, war. · Once a conflict begins and cities ere 
11 exct:-a~ged" at the cost of tens o:f millions 01' lives, the 
conflict v:ould be difficult to cont1,ol in terms of 
deescE:lation or even conditional surrender. (4) The 
cou..~ter value strategy rapidly end unnecessarily increases 
the cost and intensity of a conflict. If one begins with 
city exchange where can one go except to larser cities 
and more o:f them? Whereas, if one begins with military 
targets one has mo.re decision room in the ·~escalation lad-
der. 
Eventually the American nation must face the haz-
ards of the nuclear age. There ere no safe harbors and 
few :final anS\"!ers. The constant flov1 or technical and 
social-political change will render our plans~ weepon 
systems, and hopes obsolete ever more quickly. We can-
not stop time to gain needed rest or perspective even by 





destroy, destroy ourselves, our adverseries, and the g1,eater 
part of the hu.":1an race. Deter·rcnce es sheer terror ·,·;ill not 
deter. Defense pl&nning in the ~nited States ruust accept 
a.nd work around the i~olationist tradition of .American his-
tory and the quixotic character of decocracy if a rational 




'.nIE HISTORICAL CONTEXT CF CONTEMPORARY 
STRA '.ILG IC PLAl~Nnn 
1. The Runid Americ~n Demobi lization 
The end of the Second World ~ar found the American 
people war-weary and anxious to get back to a kind of 
normalcy. As after many past periods of great effort the 
people looked forward to a period when less \7ould be 
expected of them and when the demands of history would 
be taken-up by someone else. Concepts like balance of 
power end inte1•nati onal st&b i li ty were too abstra ct for 
the average American of 1945. He had fought his war, 
paid his taxes, done his duty. lfo·w he \'Tauted the boys 
home and an end to high taxes end Spartan planning. 
These attitudes were a very real rorce in the United 
States and they contributed to decisions that would have 
momentous and tragic consequences. 
It is one thesis of this study thet the United 
States contributed to th'e post-war international 
instability with its demobilization policies and its 
reluctance to assume a leadership role. It will also 
be argued thet the United States escsleted the dangers 
inherept in the Cold War situation first by over-




and then by totally committing American security to nuclear 
weaponry in tQp 1950 1 s. Because the United States assumed 
'- " ' ft,: I ·1. ' I "tA,'"!°I J~ lJ~.'\ ~ • ,. 
that it/I could not check Soviet power us ins conventional 
force it resorted to nuclear force. The field of competi-
tion ~as thus shifted by the United States end Soviets had 
to follo\'l. Tnis does not reean that the Soviets would not 
have developed an atomic bomb or an H-bomb. It does mean 
that the degree of dependence the USSR had to place upon 
-
nuclear weapons influenced the arms race end that total 
American reliance upon nuclear weapons int'luenced the 
Soviets to move in the same direction. There is a good 
deal of evidence that the leade1•ship of the USSR did not 
want tQ rely totally upon nuclear \'1eepons. \'.bile Marshal 
Me.lenovskii supported lllirushchev 1 s po~ i ti on in the troop 
reductions in 1960 (l,200,000 from a total of 3,628,000) 
he cautioned egainst over-relience upon nuclear missile 
l 
systems. _ 
. The third thesis of this study is that A~erican 
strategic policy has been formed not by the demands of 
the 1nterne.ti onal situ·ation but by domestic political con-
cerns. To deoonstrate this the . interface 0£_ domestic, 
attitudes nnd desires on . strategic considerations will 
be analyzed throughout the study. 
American post-war demobilization, the greatest 
1v. D. Sokolovskii, Soviet 1.:111 tnry Strategy 
(Engle~ood Cliffs: 1963), p. 1$. Also see Carl Linden, 
Ehrushchev and the Soviet Leadershi 1 -1 6 {Balti-






. sf:! e 1-f.v""'~" ~ ~ in the military his t ory, v:~s c E:.rried out \'.'J.thout an .. L + 
""0 &.M""'•-r ~ ·~ 2 -
regard for the str::teGic needs of the future. The S).""' ~~ s-~4 · "'•~.ls ~ ~"'Jue' 
strenf;th of t he .~c11icon milit ary forc e s in 19!~5 v:as 
t·;:clve end one-half million men. One ye ar later, July 
1946, these forces had been reduce d to one-quarter of 
that fiGu.re end by July of 1947 to one-eighth of their 
3 peak strength. 
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These figui1 cs r;ould support the hypothesis that 
even in the face of growing Soviet pressure the United 
States reduced its general purpose forces and that when 
the United States d~d &do~t the policy of contain.~ent it 
relied upon the Air Force and presumably the delivery or 
nuclear weapons. This reliance upon air power is sur-
prising biven the findings of the post-war Strategic 
2Testimony of General George Marshall, Senate Doc. · 
lfo. 90, ?9th Congress, 1st Session, Demobilization of the 
krmy, p. l. 
3Un:!.ted States Defense Policies Since World Wer II 
(Government Prlnting Office: 1956), p. 4. iiereafteci cited 
as U. S. Defen~e Policies, date. 
40ffice of the Secretary or Defense, Office of the 
Comptroller, Progress Reports end Statistics, pp. 22.2, 
lfov. 28, 1956. Also cited in lI. S. Defen~e P~licies, 




Borr.bing Survey thet city attacks had not substantially 
affected the course of Germon war pro due tion, nor had they 
produced significant or lasting debilitation. This would 
seeo to suggest that air power alone could not win e 
major war. Indeed the survey wes quite clear on this 
point. In the conclusion of the Japanese survey they 
noted: 
••• Atomic weapons will not have elim-
inated the need for ground troops, for surface 
vessels, for air v:ec.pons, or for the full 
coordination arr.ong them ••• but will have 
changed the contgxt in \•:hich they are 
einployed • • • • 
Strange, then, that a. few yea1.,s later the United 
Stntes would place nearly total reliance upon ail., power 
for her _n~tional security. 
The demob-ilization of tho U. S. Army and Navy 
created a political vncuui~ in Europe. Britain and France 
were militarily end economically exhausted from the war; 
Germany, Italy, and Austria r.-ere in ruins and under occu-
pation. The major political force on the continent of 
Europe was, then,the Soviet Army which faced no appre-
ci2ble counter for'ce betv1een it a.'l'ld the channel. The 
' dangers of this situation are tempered if one accepts 
26 
the observation by most leeding Soviet experts that the .~';i.,f.,.z 
I 
SH . '~ · 
Soviet Union has tended to rank low on a risk-taking 'S~''" ·~ '•luc . ~;_,;;..;;;,...;..;._~;;..;..;;.;;_;;,;:_.::._;:::::::::::::::::::::...-:._;,_-=-....:...;,;;.__;~~...;..;_......:....~_:.--..:_~ ~ ~~d~~ 
continuum. Soviet attitudes appear to be defensive end C ~~ ..... ~ 
5united States Stratecic Bo:r:binb: Survo : 
Re::>ort I!urooean \'fa r Governrr.ent .Printing 01'fice: 
.Also see i.k !itud. St2tes Str2te J::'. iC Bon:>inr.: Surve : 
Reoort J1::.oa.ne se ·;·,•nr Government ..r'rinting 01'fice: 
p. 30_. 
-'-·~ 
cautious and Soviet expansive rnoves are rarely made in the 
anticipation of firm opposition. One scholar bas found: 
The generel impression conveyed by the lit-
erature is thet the U3SR hes tended to evoid 
major foreign policy risks. Rc.nlced on a con-
tinuum fror.1 risk-taking to risk-avoiding poles; 
the leading anci influential area experts con-
sulted judged the Soviet risk-taking propensity 
to be low i•ather than high. 
No one 
Soviet Risk-Taldng .?ropensi5y as 
























The problem has been one of recognizing the threat, deter-
mining enemy intentions and capabilities. To over-estimate 
can be as deadly as to under-estimate. In a recent book 
Adam B. Ulem has ergued that t~e United States miscalcu-
lated the power of the USSR in 1945 and made needless con-
cessions on the basis of those false estimates. He argues 
"that at the moment of Germen capitulation, the United 
States had more men under arms than the USSR."7 He also 
pointed out the.t Soviet armed strength was reduced to 2.8 
6Jan F. Triska, Petter~s end Level of Riek in 
Soviet Foreifn Po!icy-l:a~:inc;. 19hS-l9bJ, U. S. !le val 
OrcinE:nce '.I'~st Station, China Leke, Celif'ornie, 1966, 
p •. 7. 
7 Adam B. Ulam, The Rivels: A.~erics and Russia 
Since \'/orld \'/ar II (Ne\7 York: 1971), p. 7. 
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nillion men in 1948. The fact Professor Ulnm omits is that 
k~erican forcen in 1948 \':e re app e oxi&nc.tcly hali' of those of 
the Soviets. Also the Soviet r-ilitary oreanizati on struc-
t~re permits more co~bat divisions per ~an than the Amer-
ican cour.ter-type. Finally the Soviets hed e vast reser-
voir of reserves which could have been mobilized rapidly. 
i.!obilization in the United States \'lDUld h~ve been a 
politicelly difficult action. F.onetheless Proi'essor 
Ulam's point of kner i can over-estimations oi' the threat 
stands. 
2. Thre~t Perceotion 
In i.farch 19!~6 Churchi ll made his Iron Curtain 
speech at-Indepcnccnc e, l:is souri, end the A.'l!ericen nation 
suddenly found a ne..-1 threet: Russian imperia lis1n . The 
Soviet Union apparently knew the.t the Truman aC.r.iinistra.-
tion had its hands tiad domestically. The .funerican 
people did not r!ant to support a large r:rl.litary establish-
ment antl yet they \';ere becoming uneasy about relations 
with the Soyiets. The Soviets fo~ their part c:.pplied 
:.. 
pressure in one place, then enother. This uas done care-
fully, continually testing and probi~~, yet not quite 
provoking the _;m~rican people to unity and action. In 
the Spring of 1948 a significant Soviet challenge 
occurred--the blockade of Berlin. 
The significance of the Eerlin crisis for this 
study is t .... ;o-fold. Q1r~ it \1as an overt Soviet chal-
lenge that gave substance to the Iron Curtain metaphor. 
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~ the A."7!crican reaction to this chr:.llcnga ·,·1as lim-
ited, C.efennivo, end nuclea1•. In the Spring of 1948 the 
Sov:.ets bec;an a series of hara3srnonts tb.o.t cli1:rn.xed r:i th. 
a complete blo cknde of' Eerl :.n. The move ·,;:ns aimed at 
pre.s:uring t:1e United States and its allies out of the 
29 
city. A.7.erican planners believed. that if the Sovie ts \- 8Vtrfu..F-Z.. 
accompli sr_cci this they \-:oulC. th€n at tem;>t to move the J 
allies out of all of \':est Ger:nany. The s tratcgic end 
political implications of such ~.ctions were vast. ~·;ith 
the loss of Berlin and then Germany the balance of po~·;er 
in Europe ~ould be tipped signi~icantly in the Soviets' 
favor•. There could have been no po'.~· er in NATO without 
e German army and r•estern Europe ·,·;ould be hostage to the 
Soviet Union. 
No attempt to gain surface access to Berlin was 
made. One reason for this ·;:as the wealmess of the Amer-
ican and allied armie:J in Europe. Thus the Soviets were 
able to take a 10'9:-risl:: situation a..'1.d exert considerable 
pressure. The Areerican reaction was measured. An eir-
lift was inaugurated which succes~fully supplied the 
city. The Sovie.ts .. did. not . i'Ilteri'ere for at the same 
time the United States moved t\10 B-29 Air groups to 
Great Britain. That these planes were cap£ble of 
delivering nuclear bombs over Soviet cities ~as mede 
8 lmoYm to Soviet leaders. It r:as no lo!'.ger a lov1-risk 
26. 
· Bu. s. Defense Policies 19h6-1956, op. cit., p. 
situ&tion. 
r.:ost interesting for this e.nalyeis are the follm7-
ing f &cts: 
1. The Ame;ric ens \'Jc::re forced into action by the 
{;rowing boldness or the Soviet Union. · 
2. The American reaction we.s limited and defen-
sive. 
3. When the United States conunitted itself to 
action it made no attempt to r0spond in kind (e.g., gen-
eral purpose forces) but resorted to •::hat amounted to 
nucleDr blackmail. 
The movement of the tgo B-29 Air groups was 
underst..andablc e;iven the American desire to 11 contain° 
the Soviets in the f~ce of lack of domestic support for 
substantial military spending. However this move may 
have been the be£inning of the nuclear weapons race. 
I£ the United States could have responded in terms or 
com.·entional forces, the Soviet forces would have main-
tained their political value. The Soviets uould prob-
ably have still had to .back do~rn but not under the 
pre~rnure· of the nuc1e a.r thre a.t •. Mot ab.le or.. willing to 
play the game with conventional forces we impelled the 
Soviet Union to place greater reliance on nuclear 
wea?ons. 'Ihis does not mean the Soviets would not have 
developed e nuclear and thermonuclear capacity. The 
argument here is one of degree. The character of the 
threat has great influence in defense planning. The 
A.~erican threat es perceived by the Soviets nas nuclear 
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strike capability PGainst Soviet citiesJ hence the Soviets 
had to counter ln kind. 
3. esc-20 
Historically American strategic thought has been 
influenced by the nation's geographical posit ion. Our 
experience hod been that tho United States had always 
h~d time to mobilize its resources when war was imminent. 
Hence the need to mainte.in a large military force was not 
as great as in Europe. 
The recognition of the existence or a constant 
long-term foreign threat suggested the necessity of a 
large perinanen t mili ta1•y establishment. This was not 
palatable-to the American people ~ho opposed both the 
concept and the cost. NSC-20 was a recognition t hat the 
Uni:ted States v1ould therefore have to plan on stre. togies 
of deterrence rather than strateeies of mobilization. 
This policy paper was v:ri tten in late 1947 or early 
1948. George Kennan is considered to have been its 
author. It was not merely a watershed in terms of Amer-
-
ican strategic thoughtJ it was also a candid appraisal 
of the reality or the Grand Alliance. The war had been 
the only source of unity between the United States and 
the Soviet Union and by 1947 with the common enemy 
de~eated the Soviets could be expected to revert to 
their historic behavior patterns. The only way to deal 
with Soviet or Russian im?erielism was from e position 
o~ po'\"1er. In July 1947 Kennan wrote: 
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The main element of any Uni t ed St ates policy 
toward the Sovie t Union must be one of a long 
term, patient but .fi1•m and viGi l ant con t ainment 
of .Russian exp a.nsi ve tendencies • • • • Soviet 
pressure eg Pinst t he f r ee i r-stitutions of the 
western world is s omething that can be cont ained 
by the adroit and v ig i lant epplic ation of coun-
terforce at a s er ie s of con s t antly shi.fting geo-
grephic&l and political points , ..• 9 
This paper was a justifica tion of the containment policy. 
It was a product of the Department of State. Little con-
sideration however seems to have be en giv~n to the means 
of this containment, In fact the military manpower of 
the United States \-;ras being r e duced as was shown in 
table on page 25. 
If NSC-20 was a r e cognition of the threat it was 
also an_ acknowledgment of the condition of Europe. Brit-
ain and France were exhausted in mil i tary and economic 
tertis . Other nations in Europe were in similar or ·worse 
condition. Yet Europe was still valuable to both the 
Soviet Union end the United States. Perhaps sensing the 
power vacutun and not wanting to lose Wes tern Europe, the 
United States undertook commitments to preserve the 
integrity of European nations. The Truman. Doctrine was 
to fill the voi.d created by the decline of British power 
in Greece and to check Soviet advances in Turkey. The 
European Recovery Plan or Marshall Plan was designed to 
build up the econom,ic power of Europe so that eventually 
911 The Sources of Soviet Conduct" 25 Foreign 
Affairs (July 1947), 575-76. This is the famous Kr. X 
article ·.·:hich contains the substance of NSC-20. Also 
see Semuel P. Euntin£ton, The Con~on Defense (New York: 
1961), Chapter II. 
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Europe could suppo1,t the military establishment necesse1-y 
to balance Soviet power. Finolly the idea of collective 
security Y:as accepted by the United States as e. means of' 
combining and coordinating the potential power of the 
Atlantic community against the Soviet Union. The result 
was NATo. 10 
4. Ask the Right Questions 
As one surveys the literature of the Cold War one ;· 
r/ is struck by the f'act that American policy makers seldom \; 
ask the right questions. Their interest seems to be 
focused upon the immediate, their solutions ad hoc. 
George Ball pointed out in 1966 that 
Ame~icans are indeed a p1•agmatic people and prag-
matism • · • . characterizes many of their govern-
ment 1 s approaches to fo1•eirn policy, which often 
takes the course of le a.st re ::ds tance . . • . It 
is easy and tempting, to become absorbed in the 
operational aspects of foreisn polic11and ignore the longer term implications • . . • 
· fue po lie y makers apparently never asked: How 
can vie contain? How can we deter? If we rely upon 
nuclear weapons ·what will be the result? If we do this 
for 1'1ve years \'lha·t can we expect the Soviets to do? 
4 
Then what will we do? Questions imply logical thought 
and logic did not lie et· the heart of defense planning. 
American defense policy was, instead, the product or 
domestic politics end bureaucratic and inter-service 
10see Paul V. Ea~.mond, The Cole War Years Amer-
ican Foreign .?o~icy Since 194$ {l~ew York: 1969), Chcp-
ter 2. 
11Quoted in Edward Weintal and Charles Bsrtlett, 
. Facing the Brink (New York: 19671, p. i.:... 
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compcti tion f'or 't) O\'!Cr e.nd resources. Some of' the most 
moiuentot-:.s decisions eve1• made by the United States govern-
ment, decisions t hat may r:e ll affect the hietory of man on 
this planet, l'Jer•e rr.ade not usil".g the best information and 
mines but v:ere p1•oclucts of petty C:omestic political cam-
12. paigns end equally petty inter-service quarrels. 
Louis Johnson Tias Secretary of Dcf'cnse in 1949· 
He is best remembered for the 11rema.inder method" of 
defense budgeting. During this period the defense budget 
had a low priority. When all of the other demands for 
resoui•ces \-:ere met tho remainder 1·:as divided among the 
military services. Little thotl8ht apparently was given 
to str!ltegic needs. .il..nd li ttlo future planning in terms 
of hard~sre or stratcGic plans was possible with this 
approach to the defense budget. Issues of national end 
international security were left to be by-products of 
domeatic policies. It was a time when no one seemed to 
be concerned with national priorities. Each of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff was attempting to get as much for his 
service as possible notuithstanding national need. or 
course the services assumed •their need ~ national 
need. Paul Hammond repo_1•ts that the JCS ,,.,ere "left to 
make their own assumptions about national objectives 
12see the case studies in Warner R. Schilling, 
Paul V. Har::znond, and Glenn Snyder's Strate~v. Politics, 
end Defense Bud pets Oie\': York: 19611 and 1.:ichael H. 





and policies • nl3 . . . An example of the inability (or 
unrlillingness) of the military cl::ief s to engage in long-
term planning and ask some of the hard questions, like 
,-;hat kind of war?, was the B-36 vs. "Super-Ca1•rier 1~B-C'"3G:' "~ 
~r"'' \ 
controversy. This was a conflict between the Air Force 
and the Navy for appropriations. The Air Force wanted 
funding for the B-36, a long-range heavy bomber designed 
for major thermonuclear war. The Navy '':e.nted appropria-
tions to build a super-carrier force to handle medium-
range bombing and tactical and strategic conflicts. The 
appropriations went to the Air Force. The real issue was 
one of roles and missions of the several services. Each 
had its little domain end each protected its own inter-
ests. Because of the unwillingness of the political 
leadership to confront the real ''costs 11 of the Cold War 
and the desire for 11 cheap 11 defense, the Air Force was 
put in a privileged position. American defense posture 
would rest with the Air Force, lessons o:f the pest, and 
:forecasts of the future notwithstanding. 14 ;The B-36 
vs. Super-Carrier .controversy sparked a b:Ltter debate 
which resulted in a congressional investigation. The 
investigation vindicated the procure~ent aspects o:f the 
B-36 and concluded that the theoretical disegreements 
between the Air Force end Naval Air were so deep that 
l3Paul Y. Hammond, OrGanizing for Defense 
(Princeton: 1961), p. 245. 
14The Strategic Bombing Survey conclusions 
are to be noted as is thel-f~17Bnd/J:, 
0 
0 
th~y would have to be settled "\':hen tested during some 
.future \':ar. nl.5 The awful thing about this last statement 
is one does not know if the committee was incredibly 
stupid, or naive or enp :ging in satanic humor. 
Another example of the l&ck of long-term planning 
during this period wes the Universal ?t:ili tary Training 
(tm~T) issue. By 1948 it was clear that the United States 
would have o\Tersea.s commitments; that these commitments 
could increase the possibilities of war; and that a 
future Tiar, limited or unlimited, Vlould require large 
numbers of me11. The political reality wes likewise 
clear; the average American neither accepted nor under-
stood the demands of the Cold War; the professional 
politician conceived it political suicide to make 
demands oi' higher draft quotas and de.fense budgets. 
The United States \':OUld tberei'ore have to meet its 
oversea~ cormni tments \'.'i thout maldng demands upon the 
popule~e. At a meeting of the National Security Coun-
cil, General Marshall was quoted as saying that tho 
United States "was. pla·ying with fi"re while~ we had 
16 
nothing with which to put it out. 11 Given the need 
for trained men and the unwillingness of the policy 
15u. s. Defense Policies, op. cit., p. 23. 
Also see 11InvestigF-tion cf the B-3b Bomber Program," 
Report of the House Committee on Armed Services, 
Blst Congress, lst Session, 1949· 
16
wa1 ter Millis (Edi tor), The Forrestal 
Diaries (Hew York: 19.51), p. 373. Also see Chap-
ter ll on UMT. 
36 
r.ial-::ers to i'orce the issue v."i th the electorate another ad 
hoc mes.sure was considered. Universal T.Tilitary Training 
would provide the nation ~ith its large pool o~ trained 
manpower snd at the seme time not be as costly as a 
le.r;:;e standh1g army. 
In theory America's future defense needs could 
be met by having a small professional volunteer army 
backed up by a rt ready reserve 11 Y:hich \":ould only be 
called up in a national crisis. Again with the aid of 
hindsight one can see that the call-up of several 
hundred thousand men would have taken from two to six 
weeks. Transportation of these men (in the late '40's) 
would have been quite a problem. How many divisions 
could be placed in Europe before the Russians reached 
the channel? Would the Soviet planners not be able to 
construct a time table '.'.hereby they could get to the 
ch3 nnel before sizable numbers of Americans arrived? 
Finally was this not an attempt to go back to the 
previous strategy of mobilization?17 
· Eventually UI.:T v:as rejected. The .. appropria-
tions for the Air Force werei increasec, with the hope 
that this· would be the first step to~ard increasing 
the Air Force to 70 Air groups. 
By July of 1948 the defense planners had no 
choice. They had to plan on the use of the atomic 
. 
17see The Comoton Corr.mittee Report, Renort 
of the P::-esident' s Aciv t~or, Conr.::!. t t e:e on liniversal 




18 bor.lb in future .American wars. The natio11 was corn..rnitted 
to a re.nge of actions end reE..ctions Y:hich. the r.iajority of 
the people never understood. Future paths '':ere pre-
deterrr~ned and fe~ national leaders made any attempt to 
examine the vast implications 0£ those acts. 
5. lYSC-68 
In mid-year 1949 a document ·which has been 
described as 11 the .first comprehensive statement of' a 
national strategy1119 was developed by a State Depart-
ment group. The military, still involved y,-ith the 
B-36 controversy, took no part in the drefting o.f this 
policy paper. nsc-68 built upon the foundations of 
Hsc-20: - ±t recognized the Soviet threat and ackno\·:1-
edged that the United States ".'.'ould have to deal with 
the Soviets .from a position of po~er. Beyond this, 
the paper was \·:ritten under the in.fluence o.f two major 
events in the international po~er balance: the Soviet 
development of atomic ..,.:eaponry several years ahead of 
Americ2n expectations, and the "loss" of the Chinese 
mainland to the Chinese Com.'E.tnists. Concerning the new 
balance o.f po·::e1"' end potential power, the paper con-
ceived four options open to American defer.se planners: 
1. A ~tetus-quo policy \~·herein the United States 
18The Forre=tal Diaries, op. cit., pp. 461-62. 
19statement attributed to Sen. Eenry Jackson, 
"Hovr Shall \7e Forge a St~r.tegy for Survival," address 
National \'/er College, \"lashir.gton,. D. C., April 16, 





wcul<l not cbullenge the Soviet bloc and would acquiesce 
in the c;rDdua1- e7.p~nsion of Soviet influence. 
2. J. . retreat t o a fortr e ss .~'nericn 1::hich •;:ould 
conce!1trete on dcfendins Jforth r.:nd South Anerica leaving 
1=1este1,n iZurope and. the developing cour~tries of Asia to 
their o~n efforts. 
3. Pre-en:ptivr:: \'.rar. !a. strike C'n Soviet nuclear 
and support .f'acili tics bc:f'ore the Sovie ts r:ould have the 
potential to des troy t he United State::;. 
4.· CollActive security and contcinment of the 
Soviet ~~ion and People'n Rapublic o.f' Chi:1B.. 
The first three options •;;ero i•cjected. Tl:e slow 
erosion o:f the American position in the \\'orld was not 
acceptcble to the generation who had just deI'eated Hitler. 
The fortress .l\..'lle1•ic a concept 1 though having romantic 
roots deep in our history, wes rendered obsolete by 
weapons techl1ology. Pre-emptive war was rejected for 
two reasons; the obvious ethical and the r.iilitary. In 
1949 the Soviet Army could have overrun Ei.:rope and the 
United States wou14 not have been able to prevent it 
e:ven if we had used_ our. only ,trump CFrd, atomic 
20 
weaponry. · 
We ,·,ere le.ft with the collective security optio;-i 
.lJ, . 
which over-cot:mitted the United States. It made allies ~ ~·'/" 
39 
qe s~ '"""·~·he 
o.f c;overnrnents whose practices were in complete v~e.._ of uc:;. 
2
°For a military view on this 1 see General 
1-!athan P. Twining, Heither Liberty nQr Safety (New 





opposition to f....-ncrican values and it cast the United States 
in a rcuctor l,ole repeatedly upho l ding the status quo and 
seemln[;ly opposing the revolution or rising e.xl)ecte.tions. 
6. The Korean ~ar 
The Korean ;"!ar stands as an example of the da.."lgers 
of i:-ii sc orn.~unic a ti on a.rnong ne. tions. If miscalculz ti on is 
to be avoid<:!d nat!.ons must clea1•ly understand each other's 
vital interests. .hfter t\·:~ ::ty years one can look beck an 
see "clea1," sit;m:ils to the Sovi et Union that the United 
States had ceased. to c.:;nsider South !Corea a vi to.l interest 
The Acheson and MacArthur statements and the v;i thdrawal of 
American troops led the Soviets to this erroneous conclu-
sion. 'r.he.. A.meric ans h~d ir:eent no such thing. '!'he ~u·Jiet 
Union, hor:ever, seeing an a;>p3rcnt politic al vacuum in an 
area contiguous to the Soviet bloc, sponsored the North 
Koreans in invadin& their soutl;ern neighbors. 21 No one 
was more sur?rised than the USSR ~hen the United States 
came to South Korea's defense. 
If the T..ar v:as based on a miscalculation of 
A.'1leri can interests there Y:as ·little doubt -as to Soviet 
I 
interest after June 25, 1950. American policy makers 
saw the invasion of South Korea as a thrust at Japan 
211fathan Leites srgues that the Bolshevik must 
exploit any opportu.'l"li ty to expand the po'.'rer of the 
m~vement. nence it ·::oul~ be natural for the Soviets 
to m~ve into the Korean vscuum. See his A Study or 








~nc the cnti1•e lune1•ican pcci tion in Asia. Pr~side.:nt Tru-
men noted that 
Co1mnunism ;·:as ecting in Kcre:a [.Si~ ju~t as 
Eitler, ~usso~ ini, ~nd the Jcpanes e ha d acted 
ten, fi~tecn, and t we nty years ear l ier. I 
felt that if Korea ~as ello~ed to fall Com-
r.1uni st loaders wou:!..d be en:boldened to override 
n!!tions closer to our own shorc::s . • • • I:f 
this ~as allowed to go unchall enGed it would 
mean a third world wnr. Just as similar 2~ 
incidents had b1'ought on the s econd World War. c__ 
The Soviets had felt that they could expand their sphe1•e 
o:f influence unchalleni;ed end were unprepared to take 
the risk that the surprising American reaction involved. 
As the Americans intervened in streng th the security of 
the Horth Korean regime was put in dani;er. The Soviets 
i;;ere not v;i lling to :field Soviet troops against the Amer-
ican rorces but at the same time could not af:ford a 
military-diplomatic defeat in Korea. The result ,·;as a 
23 
proxy war fought by the Chinese. The Americans 
believed that they could not let these events go unchal-
lenged without risking bolder acts by the Sovi et Union 
and \·1eakening the credibility o:r the Amcricz:n commitment 
to NATO. The rcsu~t was a prolonged war. 
The "maneging" of th~ Korean conflict should be 
or central importance to us as it provides some guide-
posts to future de:fense planning. There are at least 
22Ha.rry S. Truman, J.~er.:oirs, Vol. !I, Years o:f 
Triel and ?ope (:\eY: York: 1956), p. 333 quoted in 
I•iorton :n; iialperin, Limited "iiar in the i·;ucle Ar Age 
Oie11 York: 1963), p. 40. 
. 
23J. J.1. J.'iackintosh, StrateEy and Tee tics of' 
Soviet Foreign ?olicy (London: 19 3), pp. 42-50. 
) 
three JM jor problems revealed by the Korean experience: 
(1) 'lhe r.rl.litary problem of conducting e. limited we.r. 
(2) The p1•oblem of maintoining popular commi trr.ent to such 
a war. (3) The nece ssity of clear gos.ls for both of the 
above. 
The Korean War was a surprise to both sides. 
Once hostilities began, however,, neither side could 
afi'ord to back down. Nor could either side afford to 
let the conflict assume global dimensions. The deci-
sion was made to keep the v1ar limited. 24 11Liruited11 came 
to mean geographical lirnitotion, e.g., to not let the 
field of conflict spread beyond the Jtorcan peninsula, 
and weapons limitation, e.g., to not use nuclear v1eapons. 
In the case of nuclear weapons their use m1s also denied 
by the .feeling that Korea mi&ht \'.'ell be the besinning of 
the third world war with Korea es a trap to exhaust the 
American atomic stockpile. Also the Joint Chiefs ot 
2~he literatur~ on limited wer is volu.rz1inous. 
Among the articles of inte1•est for this study a.re: Gen-
eral J.io.xr:ell Taylo;r, "On Limited War," Army Information 
Digest, June 19.58, also "Improved Our Ca;:>abili ties for 
Limited ·:,'ar," ArmY Info1•r.i.n t ion Dire~t, Feb. 1959, Eric 
Larre.bee, 11 Korea: '.L1he 1.!i li tary Les son,, 11 Earner's, 
Nov. 1950, Raymond Arons, 11 Cs.n \'far in the Atomic Age Be 
Limited?" Confluence July 1956, and also "A Half Cen-
tury of Limited ~er?~ Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 
April 19.56, Bernard Brodie, 11 Unlimited \"iea.;:>ons e.nd 
Limited '::e.r," The Reoorter, Ji:ov. 18, 1954, T. N. Dupuy, 
"Can America Fight a Limited ':/ar? 11 Onbis, Spring 19ol. 
Also 11 '.Var without Victory, 11 J.:ili tar;; Revier:, I>ie.rch 
1956, and T'r!omas Schelling, 11Bari;aining, Communication 
and Limited '.·;ar, 11 Journal of Conflict rtesolution, 
I1Iarch 1957. The be:::t book on the st:bject is still Mor-





Staff felt there were few suitable tar6ets for nuclear 
weapons in Eoree.. Finally, the United States \•:as under 
great pressure from its allies not to cross the nuclear 
threshold. 
The seographical limitation placed on the war 
gave the enemy sanctuaries from which he could operate 
and to Y:hich he could .flee. This no doubt prolonged 
the war. Further, the Truman ecministration went to 
great peins to communicate to the Chinese that there 
would be no attack (air or land) on Chinese soil. This 
was meant to forestall Chinese entry into the conflict. 
Unfortunately, as hindsight reveals, it had been this 
very fear that had kept the Chinese f1~om entering the 
war. once the Chinese '.':ere as sured they had compara-
tively little to lose they joined the conflict. In a 
very real sense the administration's effort to limit 
the conn ic t backfired. On the other hand issuing a 
credible threat might have ssved lives, shortened the 
war, and improved Americe. 1 s strategic position in Asia. 25 
There are ~any elements of national power. 
Amor.g the most important is the commitment of the 
people to a goverrn:lent or policy goal. The Koree.n 
War experience detracted from American po~er · in that 
its .frustration brought disunity to the nation and cast 
doubt upon the leadership. There were several reasons 
for this reaction. The American character has not had 
25l:ialperin, Limited '.'1'ar in the Nuclear Age. 
oo. cit~, p. 49. Also see brodie, Str~t€EY in the 




much experience in helf-~·;sy measures. Quick total solu-
tions, absolute victories over natural and human enemies 
are very much part of the .h.~erican experience. By 1945. 
unconditional surrender hu.d become the only solution of' 
war the American people could accept or understand. The 
concept of limited war for limited objectives had played 
no role in the Ame1 .. ican expe1"'ience. Confused and chang-
ing objectives also led to frustration of the lunerican 
people. First Iforee ''ms not e~sential to our security. 
Then it was. Then we ... ·.-ere going to liberate all of the 
Korean peninsula, then \'.'e v:ere only going to .fight to 
preserve the status quo. Fighting a limited '':ar is dif-
ficult for a democratic political system; confusion 
ebout the-limited goals makes it nearly impossible. 
A minority concressional report in 1951 noted: 
We believe that a policy of victory must 
be announced to the American people in order 
to restore unity and confidence. It is too 
much to e;.:pect that our people ..,·"111 acce~g a 
limited war. Our policy must be to win. 
The question of how one limits war and how a 
democratic politic9:1 system can carry on this kind of 
war comes doTin to the problem, of kno~ing ~hat you are 
fightins for! Clear goals help define the parameters 
o~ the conflict, the weapons systems to be employed, 
and the strategies to be used. If one is fighting to 
261.~ili tary Situaticn in the Far East. Hearing 
before the Co::-.:.I:iit tee on 4-u'r.icd Se11 vices and the Com-
mittee ~n Forei6n Relations, U. S. Senate, 82nd Concress, 
1st Session, 1951, part 5. Also quoted Halperin, J4m-
ited ~arJ op. cit., p. 46. 
) 
) 
·.-,i:i the allegiances of the people clea1,ly i:r.C:i~crim.inate 
:.::di, bomoard:71ent is unsui t~1:le. Or if one is fit;hting to 
discoura t:; c local ae;r.ression, one should not jur:ip into 
negotiations as soon as the other side becomes pressured. 
Brodie considers the halting of the American offensive et 
the mor.ient the Cor.lITlunists indicated interest in opening 
armistice negotiations as our "cardinal error" of the 
Korean \'lar. HoY;cver I y1ould suggc st there was anothe11 
error; the total unpreparedness of the American ~eople 
for limited war. What disregard the leaders must have 
had for the people when they perntl tted myths o:f nuclear 
security v;hen such dependence would reap greater and 
grente~ insecurity! One author sums up the signifi-
cance o:r the Korean War by noting, "'Ihe lesson of Korea 
is that it happened. 11 He further notes: 
A nation that does not prepere for all the 
forms of \':ar should then renour.ce the use of 
war in national policy. A people that does 
not prepsre to fight should be morally prepared 
to surrender. To fail to prepare soldiers and 
citizens for limited, bloody grour.d action, and 
then to engage in it, is folly verging on the 
criminal.21 (Italics mine) 
._ 
7. NSC-162--The Her1 Look 
NSC-162 in 1953 wes the beginning of a complete 
reevaluation or American foreign and defense policy. 
The frustrations of the Korean Vfar had convinced the 
policy-makers that the American people were tired or 
foreign ventures and desired a kind ot modern normalcy. 
27T. R. Feb:'enbe.ch, This Kind of Wer (l~ew 
York: 1963), p. 656. This is by far the best study 




However the Eisenhoi:;er administration recognized the con-
tinuing Soviet threst. Hence the problem was essentially 
the same as it had been in the 'Irumun years, i.e., how to 
achieve both economy and security. Eisenho\':er 1 s "Hew 
Look11 policy-makers vie\7ed the threat as dual. 
There was the obvious military poY.rer of the Soviet 
bloc, but there was also the economic problem associated 
with long-term defense efforts. The Eisenhower. admin-
istration considered the Cold War to involve competition 
between the American and Russian economic systems. 'lhe 
President was very concerned about the 11 long haul 11 eco-
nornic effects of the defense cf.fort. He wanted an even, 
well-p~enned effort thet would avoid infl etion on one 
hand and depression on the other. 
In April 1953 the President seid: "This policy 
• • • will be based on the sounder theory that a very 
real danger not only exists this year but may continue 
t · t f t . • 1128 The President o exis or years o come • • 
believed that 11 Communist guns, in this sense, have been 
aiming at an economic ·target no less than -.a military 
target. 1129 American securit~ policy thus involved both 
economic end military co?siderations. One could observe 
that this was a new excuse for the old desire to obtain 
security without the cos ts of maintaining a suf.fj.cient 
military force. 
28r•'hite House press release, April 30, 1953, 
quoted in U. S. Defense Policy, oo. cit., p. 35. 




Cuts \"/ere made in General purpose forces. In fiscal 
ye er 1953 the total eJ;pcndi ture for defense \'las ~,51, 330 mil-
lion, in fiscal ye er 1954 that fi@lre had been cut to 
~47,872 million, end by 1955 the total expenciture for 
defense v:es :J42, 039 million. 30 The expenditure for the 
throe services is interesting: 31 
In l.1illions 
1953 195h. 1955 1956 
Air Force $15, 085 ~15,668 $16, q.07 $16,749 
/u-my 16,242 12, 910 8,899 8,702 
Navy 11,375 11,293 9,733 9,744 






Another :foctor became a primary policy ini'luencc 
at this time. This factor was the development of an Amer-
ican nuclca1, stockpile and means of delivery. The Eisen-
hov1er ad.ministration was prepa1,ed to accept the very 
imbalance NSC-68 had \\'arned sgainst. 
NSC-68 had assumed that stability would be 
re-established in the ruture, after the Soviet 
Union had acqui~ed an atomic air capability 
and the west had acquired. subste.ntial conven-
tional ground troops. The Hew Look assumed 
that the stability was inherent in the existing 
situation in which the Soviets backed one and 
the west backed the ~ther.32 
As one can see NSC-162 did not envision the Soviets 
JOT~ s D .... u. • eJ.ense Policies 1957, op. cit., 
Appendix G, p. 121. 
. 31~. 
32Hemmond, The Common Defense, op. cit., p. 69. 
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developing a sufficient nucl eHr capa city to che ck the 
credibility of the Americ an deterrent. This was its great-
est blunder and from the per s pect ive of def'ense planning 
its most ur.r..forgivable mistake. 
For a short time t he Americans r:ould enjoy nuclear 
superiority. Foreign pol i cy whi ch must rest upon de.fense 
policy and actual povi0r could ?recla im that the United 
States would react to ove rt aggres s ion by the USSR v:ith 
massive and instant retaliation at the time and place of 
our choosing. In short nuclear fire power Yrn s to be 
relied upon mo1•e and more e.s a substitute for troops 
armed with conventi ona l weapons. 33 Not ever yone agreed 
with this policy. General Twining said in 1958, 11 I 
believe ,·:e have to build our overall force ".:' i th the 
objective of being able to mee t any contingency with 
priorities b£>sed on enemy caoabilities and not on enemy 
intentio~s. 1134 (Italics mine) Yet in 1958 the Soviet 
Army consisted of 175 divlslons in being and could 
mobilize 300 di visions Y:i thin a . month. The United 
States on the other harid he.d Army comba t units deployed 
es folloYJS: 
Europe: Five divlsions, three separate regiments, 
two separate battle groups 
Korea: Two di visions 
Japan: Logistic support units 
33u. S. Defense Policies 1958, p. 15. 
34Departiilent of Defense ne\"ls release No. 1049-58, 
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Har;e. ii: One division 
United States: Stret< .. t;ic Army Force 
ST~ . .;F: Seven divisions 
plus 3c~ttercC. units in the Canal Zone, ii.la.ska, c.nd Form-
osa.35 Given that Soviet divisions are three to five 
thousand men swaller th~n tl~cir A.mcr-ican counterparts a 
comparison of' total manpo·::e1., \"/oulcl be of value. T'ne 
Department of the ;..'\rmy sssur..ed. the total Soviet e;rou..'t'ld 
forces to numbe:c 2~· milli:>n li16l1. The American Army 
r.tUiribered 805, 900.36 
The New Loo!c placed near totu.l dependence for 
An1e11 i can security on nucle en• we a.pons, thus forcing the 
Soviets_ to develop countermoastu1 cs age.inst these 
\1eapons. In a sen~e e. nucle Pr arms l"'3Ce wes st imu-
lated by the America11 desire to save money! But more 
im4Jorte.nt the interne.tional system developed a tola1~-
a.nee for te1•ror. And terror is an unstable currency. 
An American contribution to modern strr::.tegic 
thought was the socalled "trip-wire" strategy. In tb.e 
mid-.fii't ie s the Soviet's y;ere build.ing their ov:n nuclear 
arsenals end the !TATO s.llies' began to esk how many Amer-
ican cities the United States 't:ould exchange for 
European security. In ordE::l· ~o prove to the Russians 
and the Europeans that the United States wes firm in 
its com..Jitments it developed "trip wire. 11 It was 
obvious the twenty or tv;enty-five MATO divisions could 
35u. s. Defense ?olicies 1958, op. cit., p. 251. 
36Ib1d., pp. 4 and 71. 
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) not stop 175 Soviet divi~ions in the evo~t of w~r. Ho~­
ever the Americans noted that the ten or t\·;enty ~11eri can 
c':.ivisions in Europe r:ould have to be destroyed by the 
Soviets in any drive on Europe, and since American pub-
lic opinion would never accept that lo~::; the United 
States £OVE:rn.rnent ,·1ould have:: to c;o to r:ar. Thus the 
American ground force in Europe \~·a.s a larE,;e rear-guard 
v1hose destruction y:ould trip the vfirc that would set 




1. The End of the Eiscnhm·:er StrP. tegy 
As late as 1959 the Eisenhorrnr administration was 
still relying upon nuclear weapons as ~ means to save money 
and maintain a credible deterrent. This policy was, how-
evor, coming under increasing criticism from those aware of 
the stratet;ic 11 mix 11 of Soviet forces. Even with the 
annow1ccd reductions the Soviets wore ere di ted \'Ji th 175 
divisions (not all at full strength). Estimates of man-
power in bround forces ranGed from 2,350,000 to 2,500,000. 
It was -belioved that the Soviets could mobilize 125 divi-
1 
sions within thirty days. American e;round strength at 
this time was 861, 964 men in the Army organized in 14 div i-
s ions and 175,571 in the ~arine Corps. 2 Tho Soviet Navy 
was considered tho second most powerful in the world. The 
role and mission of the Soviet Navy \-:as mor0 li1~itcd than 
t~e Americnn Navy. The Soviets emphasized subma~ines and 
coastal defenses. · While the United States· credited the 
Soviets with 400 to 600 submarines little Amcr!.can effort 
seoms to hevo been directed at the ASW category. 
1
united States ~~fcnso Policies in iq~ , Library ~-...,..--~~--~--------~_,_'-'-'-.__-'-.__ ___ ......... _._ 
of' Congress Legislative Hcf'erencc Service USG?O, ·~1ashing-
ton: 1960), p. 5. Heree.fter cited United States Defense 
·Policies (vear). .....;;.;;.;;;..;-...:;._::~~~~---.--.,;.---
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The most threatening .element in the Soviet military 
-· .. ·- · 
forces in 19.59 was the Air Force. In 1959-60 the . Soviet Air 
Force \•ms estimated to comprise about 700, 000 men and 20, 000 
to 25, 000 aircraft (naval air included). In J,Jay 19.59 the 
Chief of Staff of the U. S. Air Force, General Thomas D. 
White, wrote: 
In my opinion, the most serious and iu!l11ediate 
throat to the freo world has been and continues to 
be strong Soviet air power • • • • They now pos-
sess a formidable bon:ber force, ballistic mis-
siles, puclear wee.pons, and a modern air defense 
systcr.i.> 
L'l January 1960 General White noted: 11Tho Soviet aerospace 
threat, in particular is increasingly pressing, diversified, 
sophisticated, and oninous. The Soviet Air Force is the 
USSR 1 s- r.icmt dancorous \-:capon. 114 
No longer \WS tho anelysio of the Soviet th1•eat con-
cerned with land forces in Europe. The Soviets ho.d by 1959-
60 developed offensive sir power. With both the devclopiP.g 
Soviet Air Force and tha new ballistic missile the USSR for 
the first time could strike a· deadly blow to the Ar.lcrican 
heartland. As the Soviet offcnsi~e air po\rnr continued to 
develop the credibility of massive retaliation began to 
decline. 
As in the late forties when the Americans rocog-
nized the reality of the Cold War, they \•;ere faced with a 
3nepartment of Defense News Release, No. 599-59, 
p. 9, quoted in United States Defense Policies 1952. 
4House Defense A~propriations Hearings for FY 61, 
Part 2, pp. 207-28, quoted in United States refcnse 
Policies 1959. 
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choice as to ho·w thoy would respond to the Soviet threat. 
This time however tho Soviet thrcut was direct and nuclear. 
The Americans were faced vii th a dilemma. How could they 
maintain a deterrent force with the Soviets approaching 
nuclear parity and at the same time not commit the ener5ies, 
resources, and manpower of the nation ~o large general pur-
pose forces? In tho late forties the Americans had 11 checkcd 11 
the Soviet advance with a nuclear shield. By the mid-
fii'ties, however, the Soviets had a. nuclear fo1•ce suffi-
5 
cient to give the Americans pnuse. The situation of the 
Soviets having both superiority in convontional forces and 
equality or sufficiency in nuclear forces began to \'lorry 
many or the NATO allies. Could the Americans oct in the 
event of a Russian attack in Europo? Would tho Americans 
react knowing that they v1ero: putting up American cities ns 
hostages? Would could the Americans do if the Russians 
lnunchod a limited or non-nuclear attnck? ~Vould ev~ry 
small strategic probe now threaten to become tho crack 
>Arnold L. Horel:i.ck ahd Myron Rush in Stre.teric 
Pom~r and Soviet Fore i~n Policy (Chicago: University or 
Chicago Press, 1965) use the' phrase strategic parity 
rather than sufficiency. They define strategic parity 
as a 11 condi tion in which tho Soviet stra tcgic i'orces ere 
sufficient to deprive even a r.1ore po.,wrful .Arr.crican 
strategic force of its political uscfulnoss'' (p. 177). 
For strategic attitudes during this period see 
Bernard Brodie's "Hm·: War Became Absurd, 11 Earner 1 s :.:arra-
zinc, October 1955, pp. 33-37; 11 Nuclcar '.'icaµons and 
Changing Stretot;ic Outlooks," Bulletin of Atomic Scien-
tists, XIII, February 1957, pp. 56-61. Also see Sir 
John Slcssnr, "A Nl!:w Strategy for the ·::est," Orbis, 
September 1958, pp. 320-336. 
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oi' doom? One European commentator wrote: 
Our LfiATO' iJ present policy, which Mr. Dulles 
has labelled 'ma ssive retaliation, 1 s eems to be 
becoming too drastic e.nd inflexible for these 
objectives. Increasingly no are getting into a 
position v1hore, in effect, \'le sholl be fo1,ced to 
threaten, and if necessa1•y initiate, the destruc-
tion of civilization in the uvent of any measure 
of aggression too po\·1erful for our small conven-
tional forces to combat.b 
Hot only was the American position dangerous but 
it was inflexible in that it did not offer different 
options e.s the situation changed. Admiral Buzzard pointed 
out: 
But since the Russians arc no\·1 developing the 
power to strike back massively at America, nassivo 
retaliation is in danger of being interpreted as 
bluff in the case of medium ogr.ression, for the 
Cor..nunists mic;ht well expect the United States to 
shr-ifik from action which is becoming increa singly 
akin to suicide . . • . Thus massive i•et a l i ation 
leaves much room for Cor.ununist exploiting and rnis-
un<lcrstnnding •••• 7 
There was another qucsti on v1hich troubled the HATO 
allios. Given that both the United States nnd the USSR 
had nuclear \':eapons and given that the Americans actually 
did defond Europe <luring a Russian advance the question 
remains, what kind of defense? Ono contemporary European 
scholar discussing the American and Soviot hydrogen bomb 
tests in the early 1950~s observed that these tests had 
aroused two contradictory reactions. 
They undermined allied confidence in the 
effectiveness of the American deterrent and 
6 Rear Adr.dral Sir Anthony Buzzard, 11Thc H Bomb: 
11~assive Retaliation or Gradu2ted Detc1•rence, 11 Inter-
national Affairs, April 1956, p. 148. 
7 lbid. 
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simultaneously, they heightened fearD lest tha 
United States should defend Europo after all 
and thereby reduce it to a radioactive \'/aste-
land.tl 
In 1959-60 especially during the Presidential cam-
paign the American tendency to overestimate Soviet military 
power becamo a public issue. The so-called missile gap 
. 
began with the success of Soviet aerospace activities and 
was kept ali vc in the western press by Ur. l'Jirushchev. In 
a speech to press representatives on Hovember 14, 1959, 
JQ111ushchev said: 
We do not want to scare anyone, but i'.'c can tell 
the truth--in saying tho.t ·::e have now stockpiled so 
many missiles and so many atomic and hydror-;en 
devices, that, if '':e were attacked, we could wipe 
all our probable enemies off the face of the 
oq,rth • • • . In one year a plant that \'/e visited 
p1~odnced 250 missiles vri th hydror,en wa1•he ads on the 
assembly line.9 
That the American policy rnnke1•s did believe in the 
existence of a missile Gap in 1959-60 is reflcctod in the 
manner in which the administration chose to respond to its 
critics. Secret ary of Defense Thomas Gates sreaking boforo 
the House Appropriations hcarinc;s argued that the existence 
or non-existence of a ·missile gap was uni1~portant. 'What 
vras important was the "deterrence gap. 11 He defined deter-
rence gap as 11 thnt situation when your total deterrent 
forco ceases to be sufficient to deter a potential enooy, 
8wolf 1.:endl, Deterrence and Persuasion: French 
Nuclear ArMm:tcnt in the Context of .l-:3tional .. Jolicy, 19L.5-
1969 (Loncon: 1970), p. 99. 
9Hew York Tj~es, Nover.iber 16, 1959. Also quoted 
in United States Defense Policies 1959. 
) 
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as contrasted with simply a numerical comparison of n single 
v1eapon. 1110 
At a tir:ie when the Americans could he.ve claimed 
absolute strategic nuclear superiority they were on the 
defensive. As one study pointed out: 
Remarlmbly some United States leaders began 
publicly to speak of nuclear ·:rar as mutual 
annihilation even before the Soviet leaders 
explicitly claimed lthnjJ capacity • • • • J.l 
What i'Je had, then, in the closing years of the 
Eisenhower adninistration vms a set of strategic policies 
and perceptions i'Ihich were adjustr.1cnts to the Soviet 
advances in nuclear weapons and their dolivery syster.is. 
Tr-e sheer existence of sufficiency on the Soviet side 
detract~cL .from the crcdibili ty of the Americ on de torrent. 
2. 1.'.ittl tip le Options 
The need for a flcxibla response £rew out of the 
Soviet success in nuclear ,.,capons development. The 
search for options involved many considerations: 
1. (The most important) being the damage level a Soviet 
first or second stpil:e could inflict on th..e United 
States. 2. The diplo~atic ~nd political byproducts of 
that situation. 3. The desire to contain the USSR and 
China. 4. The need to deter the Soviet Union fror.i 
launching a surprise first strike against the United 
10united Stntes Defense Policies 1959, p. 14. 
11Arnol c.1 Horelick end Myron Rush, Stra te~ic Po·;;er 




States. 5. The mnintennnce of the system of collective 
security. 6. The accooplis hment of these things without 
resort to a premature ,·mr or surrender and under the 
social-economic-political constraints of the American pub-
lie. 
The search for mult iple optio~s was designed to 
afford the American policy malcers Greater flexibility, 
safety, and cr!)dibility in the conduct of nati-onal secur-
ity affoirs. Specifically the policy makers would have 
greater control and influence in the conduct of nationai 
security e.f1'airs if they had several options other than 
massive retaliation. Multiple options would c;ive the 
policy_maker maximum control over the intensity of a given 
conflict. Rathe1, than dra,·:ing a line nnd automatically 
reacting if your adversary crosses i1J the existence of 
other vi able options makes it possible to control the 
coni'lict at every stage of political nnd military devel-
opment. At one point in tine a Soviet advance across 
western Europo could constitute a threat to the national 
existence of the Uni tc·d Sta tcs to 'tho oxtont that a tac-
tical nucloar stril(e \'IOUld be a proper response. At 
another point in time this mit;ht not be true. There are 
many variables that could and should effect an American 
decision to i•ca.ct to Soviet aggression. Being . cor..rnitted 
to one strategy for any reason structures the reaction 
process in such a way that the past rules the present 
with no rec;ard f'or the future. 
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Conflict control elso refers to the typo of conflict. 
At times both super powers may desiro to conduct a covert 
(rather than overt) conflict Tihere resources are expended but 
prestige is not. One or both of the super powers may conduct 
proxy wars. Or they may a tter.ipt to limit the war to a given 
geographical area, or to a. Given number of men involved, or 
to certain Tieapons or tactics. The most important limita-
12 
tion is, of course, the nuclear threshold. 
Multiple options afford control over weapon types 
and employment strategies. Even after one crosses the 
nuclear thr0shold there is a largo range of nuclear weapons 
and an almost endless range of employment st11 ategies. 
~hese il!9!ude tactical vs. stra tet;ic weapons, e.g. lm·1 vs. 
high yield. Clean bombs vs. dirty, short vs. long hulf'-
lii'e of residue i•e.dia ti on. Also air bu1•st vs. ground or 
water burst also give the attackers a measure of control 
in terms of numbe11 or types of casunl t iC3 s. No such con-
trol is possible unless the nation possesses multiple 
options. 
-
The element of control afforded .by multiple options 
is also observed in the targ~ting policy of a super power. 13 
In a situation of nuclear parity or sufficioncy, targeting 
12Herman I\ahn 1 s term; see On Escalation· (!Jew York: 
Praeser, 1965). 
13 . The distinction bet·::ecn super power and nuclear 
powor is i1:1portant ~ere. A nuclen.r poi·ter, France being a 
good cxer.1ple, possessing limited number of weapons and a 
very limited absorbtion cnpacity, vrould be forced to 
countcrvalue target. A super power, with ~reater neaponry 
and [:;renter absorbtion capacity has \•;idor options. 
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policy tends to be reciprocal. To automatically target and 
strike the enemy cities thus involves a conscious trade of 
your cities for his. To launch a spasrJ wo.r would invite a 
similElr attack on one's self. As long as nuclear war is a 
possibility there will be a requirement for rutionnlity. 
The target lists both super po·aers lceep must reflect that 
rationality. They must refl ect the element of control both 
sides maintain ove11 the ar1esome po-.·:cr of modern y,·caponry. 
Once the nuclenr threshold were crossed t.nrgeting 
could be limited to military targets located away from 
urban centers. Planners of both super powers could assist 
each other by placing potential tnili tary tarr;ets in such a 
man.,er that they could be destroyed without involving pop-
ulation- centers. If n \'mr continued beyond a few salvo's 
by ~hich all cou1rterforce targets that could be destroyed 
\·1ere destroyed, urban targets could become the next iield 
or conflict. I<::ahn hns a city targeting threshold in his 
ta.xonomy. 14 He notes: 
The example of strateric city bonbing in 
World \·far II is so firmly held in r.i.any people's 
minds es 'proper' .action that ·they cannot visu-
alize u large 'strategic \'/3.r in which cities are 
not priority objectives., 
Nuclear war may be of short duration, hence cities in them-
selves are of little Ii1ili tary value. If they were attacked 
Kahn believes it would be a calculated process. His tax-
onomy is as follows: 
14J{nhn, On Escalation, op. cit., pp. 49-51. 
Rung 38 Unmodified counterforce attack 








Slow motion counter city war 
Countcrvalue salvo 
Augmented disarr~ing attack counterforce 
and collateral counterveluc damage 
Civilian devastation attack 
All-out but controlled war 
Spasm '':ar ii l--12... 
I 
agree that even with city 
I 
Kahn arBUO~ and other strategists 
targeting, reason would require a selectivo deliberate act 
and counter act. Here a~ain the level of destruction would 
bo controlled ~ith decision time between salvo's for cost 
benefit analysis on continuing or neg otiating. 
Given nuclca1• parity ,.,i th both sides possessing 
multiple options in nuclear and conventiono.l weapons the 
city-sparing strator,ics are by far the most r a tional. 
Arthur Lee Burns has observed: 
No system of mutur.l deterrence can ensure us 
absolutely against the nucle ar holocaust, so 
from now on that uill recain a more or less 
remote possibility. r:e ought to prepare to 
maxi~ize the pos sibili t:i!cs of people survi vil"'..g 
it. 
However Professor Burns ·aefends city-sparing on ethical 
rather than rational grounds. The city-sparing strategy 
will be discussed at length later on. However related 
items deserve noting here. 
15Arthur Lee Burns, Ethic~ ~nd Deterrence: A 
Nuclc~r Balance without Eost~r:o Cit i es? Adelphi .faper 
No. 69, July 1970, p. 27. 
I ·" L .. / 
6 
The growing vulnerability of land-based missiles 
along with the mutual assured destructive capacity of the 
super powers \'till make sen-based deterrence a more rational 
and economical option for the future. Targeting policy 
could exclude populRted areas since they would not have 
threatening weapons in or near them. The subsurface naval 
. 
forces ~ay well provide deterrence plus insurance of pop-
ulation survival should deterrence fui1. 16 Possible fore-
casts will be discussed in greater depth later on. 
Thus far we have been describing tho benefits 
which would result from a i:iul tip le option strategy. 'l'he 
focus has been on the increased ability to control con-
.flict by possessing different \'teapons and stre. tcgies of 
employment-. 1.iore must be said about the specific benefits 
of general purpose forces . 
.Agreeing that deterrence is an influence proccs~ 
one can agree vii th Glenn Snyder that deterrence can influ-
ence either by thrcn.t or· punish~ent or threat oi' failure 
in the undertaking. l 7 ~he utility vnlue of punish!!~cnt or 
terror in a nuclear pa~ity situation is both diminished 
16F d. · h . f th or a iscussi.on on t e growing power o e 
subsurface Ha.vy sec Pa.ul Cohen, 11 The Erosi on of Surface 
Naval Po\·:er, 11 F'ore ii::n Afi'aiI•s, January 1971, Vol. 49, 
No. 2, pp. 330-l~l. For ~n a.'1alysis of the reliabili ty 
of lnntl-b~sed ~issiles vs. sea-based, see Geor5e H. 
Quester, 11!.!is s iles in Cubn, 1970{ 11 Forci;::n Affairs, 
April 1971, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. ~93-506. 
17This concept of leterrence or denial and nun-
i 'shr.ient will be used throuch this· po.per. Its cost com-
plete for~ulation may be found in Glenn Snyeer 1 s D~t~r­
ronce and Defense: To~Erd n ~he~rz o~ ~at !onnl Sccurlt 
.Prince t on : ~rlr:.ceton lmi·;c1•sity .1>.rcss, 19 1 • 
6 
and dangerous. As this came to be recognized in tho early 
60 1s, the denial aspect, which promises greater credibil-
ity and flexibility, found favor r1ith policy nakers of the 




(-(C ·/ f•)'~' high Defense Department official, said 01.' this new doctrine 
1 rJ.J' f 
1 f ' 
oi' .flexibility: 
In 
• • . Our ar~cd forces can be used or not used, 
as the c~se rr.ay be, in a controlled and deliberate 
way, subject at all times to the dircctiori_ of the 
highest civilian authority. Such floxibilitT 
means that we vill not be faced uith 1all or 
nothing 1 decisions. Though ·;:c ·will be capable of 
an all-out attack, we will have a much wider 
choice, so that we can pick the strategy which is 
best for us and not just t10rst fo1' the encny. And 
perhaps most important, ;·rn \'1i l l have a ;·my to stop 
the war before all the de struction ot8\·1hich the sides arc caoable has been urought .1 
. \) .S 
I 
orcfcr -to decrease oyr reliance upon nuclear weapons the 
Kennedy adr:iinistra ti on inc1•ea sed the nunber of combat-
ready Army div is ions from 11 to 16 and incrensed the l'.!ar-
ine Corps by 15,000 men. Sealift and airlift capabili-
ties were also increased. The number of attack carriers 
in service i·1as incronsed to seventeen. The Special Forces 
units added a countcrinsur!;cncy force to the adninistra-
f . ._ 
tion 1 s strategic mix. Indeed a 20 percent increase in the 
U. s. defense budget must ha~e alarmed l'.Ioscow. 19 The 
prize was Europe. The American strategy of denial es sen-
tially meant that the United States and its NATO allies 
18rJichael BroY:er, "Nuclear Strategy of the Kennedy 
AcL~inistration, 11 Bulletin of Ator.lie Scientists, October 
1962, pp. 34-41. 
19.l\ndrcw J. Pierre, 11?oli t ical-!.:ili tar"" Forrer: 
Ar.1crica Dor:n, Rus~ ia. Up, II Forcicn ?c·l ic;y' l!o. r~, F[.,.11 




would be ablo to prevent nny Sovie t victory in a ~·/e stern 
European thrust. 
In his first defcn~e message to Congress President 
Kennedy proposed that we do the following: 
A. Strengthon c apaci t y to meet limited and guer-
rilla warfare 
B. Expand research on non-nuclear weapons 
C. Increase flexibility of convention·a1 forces 
by improving our capa city to move forces in 
sizable numbei•s on short notice and suppm:•t 
them 
D. Increase non-nuclear capacity for fighter air-
craft. [f.t was believed in 1961 that manned 
aircraft would be needed during the 1965-75 
"rnis9ilo era for various limited war mis-
111::>0 
sions .~ -
Thus tho United. States Government during the Kennedy 
adrninisti•ation decided to increase the number of personnel 
in the general purpose forces, to sti~ulate non-nuclear 
weapons develop~orit, to expand airlift and senlift capabil-
I 
ity, to acquire a counterinsurgency forco, and to do all 
things necessary to deny the Soviets en easy victory in 
Europe o.nd sor.ie pnrts of Asia. As Secretary McNamara said 
berore the Ar~ed Services Committee, 
Vlhat is being proposed at this ti~e is not a 
revorsal of our e~isting national policy but 
20unitcd States Defense Policies 1961, pp. 26-27. 
( 
an incroase in our non-nuclear capabilities to pro-
vide a greater dce;ree of versatility to our ltmited 
war forccs.21 
3. Limi tcd ·:.'ar and Conflict J,7aner:er1ent 
The capability to engage the Soviet Union in a lim-
ited war was a central goal of' the Kennedy administration. 
Realizing that coni'lic ts of the Cold ·rlar v1ould continue, 
the plaru1c11 !> and policy makers sour:ht to manage conf'lict 
rather than abolish it. Being men of hich ideals, they did 
did not dismiss the ending of humnn conflict lightly, how-
ever they were realists faced with the f'ull responsibility 
of docision. 22 Therefore they chose the probability or war 
ovcl" the possibility of eternal peaco. They further chose 
limitea -Vtar c...ver total wa:t' as a better meuoa of controlling 
and preserving the human condition. 
Tho steategic importance of limited wnr in a situ-
ation of super power nuclear sufficiency is clear. The 
means 01' achieving it are lens so. Beginning in the niid-
1'ifties debates over tho definition, nature, and possibil-
ity of limited war occupied many. of tho academic 
----·- --- ·- --·· 
21Ibid., p. 27. 
22Thc account of the Cuban missile crisis by Robert 
Kennedy clearly reflects this high idealism and r.ioralistic 
view or international lnw. 
6, 
stratcgi~ts. 23 If a war betvoen tho Soviet Union and tho 
United States occurred how could it be limited? If' one 
side or the other began to lose would it choose defeat 
rather than use its nuclear arsenal? Once a v:ar began 
would the winning side settle f'or conditional surrender 
or would it push for total victory? If so what option 
would the losing side have? In the mid-fifties the Korean 
War was held to be e prime example of a limited war. 
Bernard Brodie wrote: 
A limited vmr does not necessarily mean war 
without victory, but the ter1~s l!l.US t be short of' 
unconditional surrender ond give the vnnquished 
a chance to negotiate on a reasonable basis. 
It is ar.iazing how we spontaneou~>ly P.pted on 
these propositions in Ko1~ea • • • • 24 
- A limited war involves limited objectives, a geo-
graphical limitation of' the field of conflict, and a lim-
itation as to ~capons used. Hanson Baldwin hns noted thnt 
"a lir.iited \'tar must be limited first and fundamentnlly by 
23Exa1:!plcs of the thinkinc; of this period e.rc to 
be found in Rear Ack.iral Sir Anthony W. Buzzard et nl, 
On LiMitin:::- Ato::tic ~·for (London: Royal !n!'.;titute of Inter-
national -=~l'fairs, 19.36); Robert Osgood, Lir!itcd ~far: Tnc 
Chal lenr:c to ~·~::•er ic o.n Sc cnri t ( Chicaf;O: · li:li versity 01~ 
9J~icago .n:-oss, 1957 . ;:.. c.; 1•nn,rd i3rodie revio;·:ed this book 
in 11 !.!orc about Liaited riar, II r.:Orlcl ?olitics, Octobel" 
1957, pp. 112-122. Also sec Bernard n~oclio, 11 Unlir.iited 
\~'ea pons and Limi tcd \'Ja11 , · 11 The ncnorter, Novet':lber 18, 1954, 
pp. 16-21. For the military vie~·! on limited war see 
Colonel T. N. Dupuy, "War without Victory, 11 !.rili t.e..r"t 
Review, l.!a1•ch 1956, pp. 28-32 and/or Rear ,\dmil~a1 Joh.."1 D. 
Hayes, 11Perip,he ral Strategy ••• Littoral Tactics ••• 
Li~i ted ~·fer, ' Arny Co:-~bnt Forces Jou1~~.n.l, Vol. 5, Septem-
ber 1954, pp. 3b-39, and i.:ajor General James j,I. Gavin, 
11 Cavalry, and I Don't J,ican Horses, II Harpcr 1 s r.Ia!<:azine, 
April 195h, pp. 54-60. 
24Bcrnerd Brodie, 11 Unlir.ti ted \'/eapo!1s a."'l.d Unlim-
i tcd War, 11 The R~oorter, lfovenber 18, 1954,. p. 9. 
the objectives, intentions, and Ylill of the participants. 1125 
Writing in a i;cncral but prophetic view, Baldwin also pointed 
out: 
A war of fuzzy, ill-defined or unlir.i.itcd aims 
encourages unlimited neasures. The fundencntal 
requirer.:ent to kc cp •.:rn.r lirii ted is to know \'Iha t 
you are fighting for, to define the price
2
tou are 
\•rilling to pay for the obj E.: cti vo s • . .; • 
Yet the central question .facing the American admin-
istration was how to sccura lir.1i tcd means. The very old, 
and ' 1 cry Ar;1e1•icnn question of cheap defense was as real in 
1960 as it had been in 1947. lfoi thcr the Americans nor 
the allies \'tere willing to maintain suf.ficicr.t conventional 
troops t~ ~top a Soviet advance i11 Europe \':ithout rccou11 se 
to 11 limi tc d or tactical nuclc n.r weapons. 11 The Eu1•opcans 
understood this. Writing in 1956 Rs :,T.lond Aron points out: 
In a non-a tor.tic war the \';'est ·;:ill have· lest 
be.fore it has begun to .fi[;ht. At a very ::~inir::m::1. 
tho \Jost will be forced to ncccpt the occupation 
by the Soviet ormie9 of i~acnsc territories and 
to engage in inter::dnable hostilities .•. a 
kind of ,·mr '::hich ·,;:ould be no lese disastrous 
for civilization than an ato~ic wcr.27 
In 1959 Vice Adr.liral Br.o'>m, former Com.~andor of the Sixth 
Fleet, stated before the rfational Press Club in ·.·!ashington: 
"I havo no faith in the so-called controlled use of atomic 
weapons no matter how small, when both sides have the pm·:cr 
to destroy tho rrorld. 1128 While Aron believes that Europe 
25!ianson W. Bald\'lin, 11Liuii tod \Var, 11 The Atlantic, 
May 195 9, P • 3 7 • 
26Ibid. 
27Baymond Aron, 11 Can War in the Atomic Age Be Lim-
ited," Confluence, July 1956, pp. 100-101. 
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could only be dofondod with nuclear Y:eapons, Hanson Baldwin 
pointed out that •r . . • in European target systems (sic) 
are too intermixed: civilian and military, area and 
point, tactical and strateeic; ••• the battlefield is 
too small and not sufficiently defined by natural barriers. 11 
He states categorically: 11 A limited Y:ar in '·:estern Europe 
is impossible; the use of nucloar weapons in this area 
would invoke cutastropho. 1129 
That the United States could settle for something 
less than unconditional surrender was attested to by Korea 
and la tor Vietnam. That geogrnphical li1~Ii tations -could be 
observed was also made cleor. Though nuclear weapons wore 
not used, they continued to be the major doubt in the 
omerc;ing concept of l:J.r.1itcd war. 
Tho major pro bl c:n in limited war Yrns that the Uni tcd 
States Y1ould not 01• could not maintain the forces necessary 
to right nnd expect to vrin a limi tcd war without recourse to 
nuclear weapons. General Maxwell Taylor, spqaking in 1958, 
suggested a five-point prograrn to meet tho challenge of lirn-
ited \'far: 
1. Modernization of appropriate cquipr.:ent 
2. Improved strategic mobility of limited war i'orces 
3. Pre-plnnncd use of air- and sealift forces 
4. Expnnded joint planning and trnining 
5. Publicizing limi tcd war strength30 
29rbid., p. 41. 
30l;!o.x~·;ell Taylor, 11 Ir.J.proving Our Cap:..bili ties for 
Lki ted \Var, 11 Arl:'.y Inforr:?ation Dir:est, February 19.59, p. 7. 
It is interesting that General Taylor did not ask for the 
one thing his program really needed--men. 
For their part the Soviets rejected the concept of 
limited war. In a note to Eisenhower, N. A. Bulganin 
pointed out: 
One of the arguments, offered by the military 
western circles to justify their demands for the 
expansion of military preparation, is the so 
called theory of 'local ~nrs. 1 It is nccc~sary 
to stress most emphatically that this 'theory' is 
not only unsound from a military point of view, 
but that it is politically very dangerous. In 
the past ••• global wars began as 'local' wars. 
Can anyone seriously count on the possibility to 
'localize' wars in our times, when there are in 
the world opposing military µ' cups \'lhich comprise 
dozens of states in different parts of the world, 
while tho action of present \'teapons has no geo-
graphic limits?31 
Soviet rlilitary literature has tended to dismiss 
the possibility of limited war. Their attitude as exem-
plified by Bulganin's letter is that war between the 
super powers cannot be limited. 
. . . It would be crir.1inal frivolity on the 
part of the American leaders ii' they were seri-
ously expecting thnt once they had unleashed a 
war against the socialist states it could be 
kept within certain bounds. If. there is s 
clash bet\':een the t\'10 giants--the Soviet Union 
and the United Statcs--that possess po•::crful 
economies and big stocks of nuclear weapons, 
neither side, of course will '7ant to concede 
defeat before resorting to the use of all the 
weapons, including the most devastating ones.3~ 
There is obviously a distinction between what 
Soviet spokesmen say and what they believe or practice 
31Trnnslatcd . by Leon Goure, "Soviet Com.-ncntary on 
the Doctrine of Lir.ti te d War, 11 Rand Corpora ti on (Santa 
Monica: 1958), p. 10. 
32Quoted in Soviet J.:11 i tar" Stra tcr- , ed. by V. D. 
Sokolovskii, first edition A 3nnd Corporation rcs~~ rch 
study, EI'lGlf?i/OOd Cliffs: 196J) • . 
6£ 
with respect to limited we.r. 'lhc Soviet insistence on the 
impossibility of limiting "local wars" sorves a deterrent 
function. The second edition of tho Sokolovskii book con-
tinued to express doubt of the utility of a counterforce 
strategy, but their attitude is seen as an effort to 
11reinforce the credibility of the Soviet deterrent pos-
ture. n33 And Soviet support for the wars of national lib-
eration and limited e.ction in lforea and Vietnam suggests 
an awareness of' tho danger of an all or nothing approach. 34 
Tha Soviet insistence that the use of even tactical nuclear 
weapons is the point at \'1hich limited we.r will become uncon-
trolled is perhaps aimed e.t the resolve of tho west. Moscow 
lmows full well that NATO forces must depend upon tactical 
nuclear firepower_ in order to stop a potential advance from 
the east. 
In many respects the Soviet attitude denying lim-
ited war is similar to the pre-Kennedy American attitude: 
fuey evidently 11hoped to strengthen detorrenco by er.lphasiz-
ing an unqualified Soviet nuclear response. 1135 This posi-
tion is similar to . the instant and· massive retaliation 
doctrine associated \':ith John Foster Dulles. It is as 
dangerous and irrational from the perspective of Soviet 
interests as i .t was from American interests. One author-
ity has concluded: 
33Thomas W. Wolfe, 
Thought," Forci5n Affairs, 
p. 479. 
34Ibid.' p. 481. 
35rbid. 
"Shifts in Soviet Stre.te~ic 
Vol. 2, No. 3, April 1964, 
D 
Today, however, there are signs that the Soviet 
position 011 loo al and lir:ii tcd ·.·rar is undergoing 
chanse. A eood dcnl of inconsistency characterizes 
Soviet trcatnent of the subject, and no unified 
doctrine of lirni ted v1a:r applying to Soviet forces 
has or.1crgod. Nevertheless, more attention is being 
given to the possibility of local wars, and there 
seecs to be some effort, particularly in military 
journals, to treat tge subject of escalation in a 
less arbitrary way.3 
7C 
A few years later the seme scholar would write the Q: rwec.c.. 
Soviets had (by 1967) recognized the need to prepare for ~~~C'~·"'-­
~< 
operations belovr the level of general nuclear war and had V4o~ / .,c,,~ ~ 
u4' ., ~ .. 
taken the first steps toward becoming a "globally r:iobile e..e..~ c• '-
military power. 1137 ""' ~ -~\.- t'"":( With the growth of power comes an ~ v'? 
\\(>I". ' 
a~areness and a fear and then a respect. The Soviets may 
be moving along that path as did the Americans before them. 
They may discover that limitod war is the lesser of the 
evils facing policy makers today. 
In analyzing the Cuben missile crisis tho first 
question one would ask is ·whY, did \'le have a crisis in the 
fi1~st place? 1.iost scholars abrec that tho Soviets hoped 
to cheaply redress . a situation of strategic imbalance. 
One answer is that the Soviets hoped to dcfle ct pressure 
£rom domestic sources, which were demanding a larger 
share of the GNP and i'rom the international socialist 
leadership, which was demanding ?:lore vigorous action 
against the capitalist \'lest. The Soviets were gambling 
36Ibid. 
37 Thoraas W. \'/olfc, The Soviet Quest !'or liore 
Globally J.:obi le ~=i li t~ry PO\·:er (Santa :.:onica: 1'hc 
Rand Corporation, 1967), p. v. 
that the United States would not or could not react until 
the missiles were oP.erationel. In answeri:ng the question 
of why we had a missile crisis one theme is constant. 
The credibility of the American deterrent had declined. 
One scholar put it this way: 11 '.Ille Russians stationed mis-
siles in Cuba because they thout;ht they might be permitted 
to do so ••. they did not believe our threat. n38 Noting 
the American reluctance to back up ·rrords with force the 
same scholar argues that 11 the Russians did not miscalculate 
in Cuba; they drew reasonable conclusions from our bohav-
ior. 1139 The Bay of Pigs episode may have sibnallcd a lack 
of resolve as \1011 as a breakdown in adr.iinistrative 
machinery. Tho readjustment o:r the American commitment to 
Laos, as well as :the lack of firmness v.·hen the Soviets 
objected to the proposed fifth annual meeting of the West 
German Senate in \'lest Berlin may have do tr acted from the 
credibility or the American threat. 4° 
Yet the Cuban missile crisis was a watershed in 
American defense policy. It was the first major military 
confrontation bctvrecn the two super por1Crs. It was one of 
the few times the United States plcdGed publicly to use 
nuclear ~eapons against the Soviet Union. It was an ulti-
rnatur.i backed by both the conventional and nuclear forces 
of the United States. 
38Ja.mos L. Payne,, The American Threat (Chicago: 
Markham, 1970),, p. 46. 
39Ibid., p. 47. 
4°ib1d., pp. 48-56. 
J.Iany scholars have argued that Cuba was a turning 
point in Soviet acceptance of stratcGiC in:f'oriority. After 
Cuba the Soviets aro said to have set about the business of 
redressing their strategic in.feriori ty vii th a vengeance. 
Yet tho evidence docs not wholly support that argument. 
For exaMple the ccfonse expenditures ~r the USSR n~ter the 
Cuban missile crisis do not reflect a constant upward pro-
gression until after 1967. Note the defense expenditures 







































The figures ror ICBI.!/SLBI.t deployment reflect a similar pat-
tern. The dcployr.ient rates of the United States and USSR 
from 1961 to 1971 are shown on the following page:42 
41Taken from The r.:ili tn::iv B~lar.ce lQ 1-... 2 
(London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971 , p. 62. 
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The figures reflect the American defense program in 
the early years of the Kennedy administration. They do not ~.1 \ ... y 
reflect a constant Soviet drive for parity or superiority ~~~ 
in strategic missiles until 1967-68. In 1963-64 the Soviets ~o ~o?. 
increased their ICBM force by 70 and in 1965-66 by 30. In 
1967 they increased their force by 160 and the next year 
they nearly doubled it, from 460 to Boo missiles. Through-
out the ten-year period their SLB!1I f'orces were· nearly con-
stant, 100 in 1963 and 130 in 1968. not until 1969 did 
they bogin to deploy significant nu1;ibers of sea-based r.iis-
siles. 
Since 1969 the USSR has surpassed the United States 
in ICBJ,p s deployed, and in 197!. the Soviet Union surpassed 
the total American missile force.43 Yet both nations have 
long passed the point ~rere sheer numbers have real stra-
tegic meaning. Now other factors such as CEP; i.:RIV, and 
survivability r.iust be included in any power calculus. Yet 
the fact remains that tho relative positions of the super 
po~ers havo significantly changed since the Cuban missile 
crisis. 
I 
The developncnt or the crisis is attributable to 
the decline of the credibility of the American deterrent 
and the related issue of the ffiiscalculations of the Soviet 
leaders as to the resolve of tho A.~erican leadership and 93:~ ~·~ 
~~"""'"'""" . the capability of the American national security structure\~~'- ~ 
to act in a crisis. The question of the result of the 
crisis involves strategic parity between the two super 
43Ibid. 
powers. The last question to be asked is what had the 
Soviets hoped to gain? 
The Soviets do not take offensive risk lightly. 
The expert literature generally ~ssumes Soviet avoidance of 
major foreign policy risks.44 On one hand the Soviets 
were encouraged to take risl:s by the ambivalent attitude of 
the United States in the Bay of Pigs, in Laos, in Berlin. 
On the other hand Soviet analysts must have bc~n troubled 
by the 111\ionroe Doctrine mentality11 the Americans had to\'m.rd 
the hemisphere and more speci~ically by the defense proeram 
of the Kennedy administ1,ation. 4.5 In the end t .hey ·must have 
concluded that the Americans could not or would not act 
until the missiles became operational. One scholar has 
argued that the Soviets believe the Americnns to have a 
11 high tolerance threshold which inspires the Soviets' 
nibbling tactics." This, he argues, has shaped the post-
\':ar USSR strategy of chipping av;ay at United States inter-
ests ,.d thout coni'ronting tho United States with a massive 
challenge.46 
It is said -that Mr. Khrushchev believed President 
Ken..~edy to be absorbed in the forthcoming Congressional 
ltl+Jon F. Triska, Studies in Deter~cnce XIII Pat-
tern and Level of Risk in Soviet Fore icn iolic :.;akinr:., 
l -1 o China Lake: U. S. Naval Ordnance Test Sta-
tion, October 1966), p. 65. 
4.5see Payne, The American Threat, op. cit., 
Chapters 2 ond J. 
46 John R. Thor.ias, 11Lir.ii tcd ~~:ar in Soviet Strategic 
Thinking, " Re search Anal ~rs is Coroora ti on (l.icLean, Virfinia: 
Strategic Studies Division, ~ovc~bcr 1965), p. 22. 
7; 
) elections and hence un\·lilling to i'ight for Cuba. 47 There 
also rornains that enigmatic stat ement Khrushchev made to 
Robert Frost when he said the Ar.lcricans \7orc "too generous 
to i'ight. 1148 Yot r1hen the President delivered his ul ti-
matumj when he threatened to attack the Russians' homeland; 
and when the Soviets received evidence i'ror.i their O\m 
intelliE;ence that military po\'1er ·.·1as being prepared, they 
backed down.h9 
Some scholars have argued that the Soviets ~ere 
:faced \'1ith a dilerune. in 1962. The Ker.nedy administration 
had indicated its plans to expand American militory power, 
both stratcr;ic and General purpose. The Soviets were thon 
in a position of strategic inferiority. How in the face 
of A.>norican strategic supremacy could tht: Soviets assume a 
military posture adequate to support Soviet policy objec-
tivcs?50 Soviet interest was in central Europe. The 
question was how to gain inf'luence. Horelick and Rush 
argue: 
In Berlin, the Soviet lce.ders v:ere umlilling 
to press ahead because the United States uas 
insufficiently intiraidatcd. In Cuba, thoy hoped 
to acquire additional n;cans of intimidation and 
thereby lessen tho likelihood of s. da.ngerous 
47Edward ~·:ointol nnd Charles Bartlett, Facintr the 
Brink (New York: 1967), p. 57. 
48Ibid. 
49rb5.d., ?· 56. Also note .John R. Thomas' study, 
op. cit., uhich arGucs that the Soviets tend to be appre-
hensive over the possibility of the .i:\nericans overreactir.g 
"by adopting a narrowly 'ci~i tary' approach to \"mr. 11 
50Arnold L. Horelick and ?.:yron Ruch, Stra t c Fic 
Po·wor and So,; iet Foreirn Policy (Chicat;o: 1965), p. 153. 
7 
American respon§e to measures the USSR r.iight take 
against Berlin.~l 
Carl Linden argues that Khrushchev hoped to redress 
Soviet strategic i nferiority by placing missiles in Cuba. 
Linden agrees that the missiles provided Khrushchev with 
11a powerful negotiating lever" espccinlly with regard to 
Berlin. The Cuban venture v1as an attempt to secure 11 cheap 
and quick" r.iili tary-poli ti cal po\'ier. It failed. Ho\·1ever 
some time after itn failure a series of increases in tho 
Soviet military budset began that continued well into the 
seventies.52 This failure reversed the consumer-oriented 
budget policies of l\hrushchev when he admitted that enor-
mous resources v1ould be required to maintain the So:viot 
position in the ~orld.53 
J\lost scholars thus for agree that the Cuban mis-
silo crisis Tias an atteopt to redross Soviet strategic 
ini'eriority, to gain pot'.'ar and influence to force a 
settlement over Berlin by checking any dangoi~ous .Amcri-
can response. ?.rest oi' the authorities on the subject 
agree tho crisis resulted l"roru n Soviet miscalculation 
of tho young 1\mericnn President, ot the resolve of the 
Amoricnn 6overn.~ent, and of the decision naking procoss 
51Ibid., p. 142. 
52Linden, op. cit., p. 157. Also see StrateKic 
Survey 1971 (London: lnstitute for Strategic Studies, 
1972). 
53\'/oli', .Su\·iet St!'2tci:-~r a.t the Crossroc~c.::, 
op. cit., p. 43. 
77 
) in the United Statcs.54 
Another answer to the question of Ylhat the Sovie ts 
wero seeking in Cuba is provided by Adam B. UJ.am . The 
Soviets 1 main interest ho.s boen nnd \"/ill continue to be 
Europe, especially Germany. The continued American pres-
ence in Berlin was to the Soviet p o int of view un."11atural 
and embarrassing. I.Ioreover the continual gro\7th of West 
Gerr.tany in econonic and r.iili tary power fore sha·dov:ed that 
time ... -:hen the Uni tcd Sta tes \•;ould give nuclear \'/eapons to 
its most powerful continental ally or \"then the Germans 
would be o.blc to produce nuclear Y1eapons independently 
o:r knerica or NATO. In either case Soviet security was 
threatened fror.? the Soviet point of' -vicm. UlD.Ll argues 
that the Soviets i.•1ere atter.1pting to gain leverage to 
force the United States to agree upon a linitation of 
nuclc£l.r weapons. 11 Pc1,haps the roud to barring nuclear 
Y1eapons in Germany and Chi!'.a r.iight lead through Ho.van.a. u55 
Professor Ulam's thesis is provocative althout;h ho adr.tlts 
that r:1any students have expressed reservations on his 
interpretation of ~ho ~issile cri~is.56 
' lfot¥1i thstanding y;hat the Russians sought in Cuba 
54J. 1~. !.{acKintosh, Strat.cr-:r and Tactics of Soviet 
Foreign Pc lic:y (!ie\'l York: Oxford vniversi ty ?ress, 1963). 
Wointol t.!~d -"lartlett, Paci!'£ the Driri.k, op. cit. .Tames L. 
Payne, Tht3 At:!ericnn Th:?:'c::t, op. cit., and ':i.1homa.s ·.-:oli' cited 
above. 
55A~ B un ~h R. , • A i a a R ss1·a aam • ,.i..am, _ ._e J. va~s. mer c an . u 
Since World Wt!r II (Hew York: 1971), p. 314. 





most schola1,s agree the Cuban missile crisis proved a.t le.st 
thnt tho Anerica.n de·terrcnt stra tegy of massive retaliation 
was outdated and dangerous. The Soviet nove to sufficiency 
had changed the balance of power. The 1'~ATO allies were 
also affected by the ne\"1 balnnce. They were concerned 
about the viability of tho Ar.:e ricsn nuclear shield and at 
the sar.ic tir.!c concerne d with nuclear strategy as it might 
apply to a Europet.?n battleeround. Tho Americans for 
their part overreacted to the psychological pressure of 
the Cold Wox. Thoy soon overestimated Soviet po·;:er, 
underestimated their oYm, nnd hence elevated Soviet polit-
ical power beyond in-being military realities. One thing 
was mo.de clear hm·mver. The Soviets had now forced tho 
Americans to rethink the strategic plQ.ns. The Soviet 
move to sufficiency destroyed massive r e taliation. For 
their part the Sovie ts' action in Cuba confirmed the 
defense objectives of the Kennedy administration. 
Within a fev1 days of the beginning of tho crisis a ~as­
sive movc~ent of general purpose forces converged toward . 
the southeo.st pa.rt of tho United States. The Uavy had 
180 ships involved in the Cuban operation, the Ar1:iy had 
8 divisions prepared for movement to Florida, the stra-
tegic forces were dispersed and/or on airborne alert. 
11Multiple options with a vongoance stood rcady·by the 
President's hand.u57 
57 "'ill" t1r J~ •f ~ Th t· •• 
,, ian '' • ~at, r.:~n.."1, • c •.. c 4•rir.:arn 
(lfo·,·1 York: 1964), p_p. 271-273. Stro. t~~ r:.y 
7 ~ 
) 
· 5. Tho Quest i'or a Credible Stro.ter;y 
Tae Cuban missile crisis confir~ed many theories 
about conflict management in the nuclear age. First it 
clearly affirned tho need ·Ior consistency. The great 
powers must make clear to oach other their pci-•ceptions 
or vital interests. It is only through this kind of 
expected behavior that tho rational operation of the 
international Sj~tem can proceed. If a super power is 
unsure of a given set of objectives it may invite 
expansionist action by t he other, v1herein corilntitr.1ent, 
prcstit;e, and position becot1e invosted with a valuG 
greater than the originol objective. or course the 
sitper poYrers can back down as tho Soviets did in Cuba, 
but it is a dangerous situ~tion that forces a super 
poner to reverse its position.SB 
A second lesson related to the need fo1• con-
sis tency has to do vri th the credibility of the deter-
rent. \\'hen the United States indicntes a given sot of 
vital interests and further indicates a v:illingncss to 
£ight to preserve those interests, that statement must 
be believed! Tho value of protecting the credibility 
or the American deterrent cannot be overstressed. The 
United States or any super po~er must be certain that 
S8rleintol and Bartlett rnske reference to a post 
mortem critique \·,Ti ttc:i by \7alt Rostow and P~ul Ni tze in 
1963 of the ttissile crisis .•,;;hore they discussed · the 
Soviets 1 2bili ty to probe and then ndvancc or withdraw. 
"Advance and .,.,i thdrawals a.re mutually consistent policies 




its interests do not exceed its capabilities. But if inter-
ests arc defined and if the policy is consistent with the 
realities of po~cr in the international system, the opposine 
super power should be eeterred. Ii' it is not deterred con-
.flict is likely and direct nuclear confrontation is pos-1 f1i (,.r. • {.·f'"''t 
---
sible. 
The Cubon missile crisis also brought home the value 
of mul tiplc options. Thore Y!ill be miscalcul~tions and very 
probably conflicts between American and Russian interests. 
The ultimate interests of both nations (or blocs) will be 
best served by limiting those conflicts in terms of weapons 
· systems, geoGrnphical areas, and cost-risk factors. Had 
the President been forced to take more drastic action in 
Cuba, e landing by 100, 000 American troops v1ould ho.ve been 
pre.ferable to the use oi' nuclear \·:ea pons. 
Finally the crisis brought home the fact that 
nuclear war is still a very real possibility. The Soviet 
Union having achieved sufficiency was then c!emanding that 
some of the operational rules of the intcrn3tional system 
be changed. Tho most obvious of these changes was that 
the United States could no J.'.onger depend upon its nuclear 
arsenal to redress its inferiority in general purpose 
forces; and that the nuclear shield of the Atlantic alli-
ance was no longer credible. It was in this ne\7 strategic 
situation of Soviet nuclear suf.ficiency that the Kdnnedy 
adr.linistretion attempted to find a new set of options. 
This was to be no easy shift from one policy to another. 




himself would announce three different defense strategies 
for the United Sta~es: 
On June 6, 1962, Secretary r.rcHamara said in his Ann 
Arbor speech that current American strategic planning 
envisaged attacks on ene~y forces rather than on their 
civilian populations, i.e. a counterforce stratogy.59 
On February 10, 1962, Alain Enthoven announced 
that the American approach to stratesic pla.nning n . . . 
is based on options, deliberotion, flexibility end con-
60 
trol," i.e. flexible response. 
During the Cuban missile crisis President Kennedy 
said that if one nuclear missile were l::>.unched from Cuba 
against any nation in the Wcstc11n He1aisphero, that \"lould 
? 
J 
be regarded as 110.n attack by the Soviet Union on the United I 
States requiring a full retaliatory response upon t~~ 
Soviet Union, 11 i.e. massive retaliation. 61 
Thus three distincr-; trategies were officially 
announcod in less than nine months. The search for a new 
strategy did not begin with the Cuban tiissile crisis. 
True, the events of those thirteen' autumn days in 1962 
brought into sha11 p focus the 'need for new strategic con-
cepts, but the inadequacy or American strategic policy 
went to the very core or the Kennedy national security 
591·Ieville Brolm, Nuclc ~r W£1r: '!he Ir.mending Stra-




) program. Kennedy fully rcrilized that among th~ liATO allies 
and members of the Warsar; Pact there was developing a dis-
belief that any American President could or would risk 
Chicago or Los Angeles for the defense of Paris or Berlin. 
In his address of July 1961 during the Berlin crisis the 
President 
stressed the necessity of the U. S. developing 
alternatives botwccn hur11iliation and total 
nuclear \':ar the. t v:ould enable it to defend its 
allies throughout the world \7i thout brip2ir.:g on 
extensive eamsge to the U. S. ho~clond.V 
Given the full implications of the Soviet move to 
parity it is not surprising that the European allies 
doubted that the United States could 11 develop those alter-
natives" which could defend the KA'.IO allies and. not dcvas-
tnto the United States. A logical solution to this ciler;:na 
was offered by Robert ;.:cif.n1ara. In a speech nt Ann Arbor 
v:hich vms said to ·be "a watered dorm version of \"/hat he 
had said the previous ntonth to the !TA'IO council in Athens" 
UcNern.ara publicly dezcribed his city-sparing stratcr;y. 63 
After describing the history of the HATO alliance 
Mcflar.iai•a directly ·confronted th!3 issue. He said: 
-------------------·----···---
621.:orton H. Halperin, Studies in De t~rrence IX 
De t c r1• enc e 8nd Lo c n 1 ~·; nr ( C hin-a~L..._a __ k __ e-':'--_.u .... ____,s,_..-N--' a_v_e_l--Gr-d-
nanc c 'i.'esting Station, 1963). 
63,,. h l B ... ,,.. l'T I St t . c 
---- .. -· · . 
l•u..c ae ro~.cr, ... c .. amcra s ra egy. on-
trollcd Ther~onuclear ,::ar, II Nm·; r{eoublic, July 30, 1962, 
p. 11. 
It has been arf;UOd thot the increasing vulner-
ability of the ~nited States to nuclear attack 
makes us less ~illlng as a partner in the defense 
of Europe and hep.ce l:! ss cf fc ct i vo in deterring 
such an attack.6~ 
J.Icllamara also surfaced the issue of independent national 
nuclear forces and pointed out that only a common inte-
grated defense could sofeguard the alliance. He arBued 
that there were .four central elements· to be considered 
in a discussion o.f nuclear strategy: 
First, the alliance hes ovcrell nuclear 
st1•cnfth Rdequate to any challenge confronting 
it. ~ccond, this strength not only minir.uzcs 
the likelihood of r.H:jor nuclcnr r1 2r but nakes 
possible a stratc~v l c sirned to or~scrv~ the 
fabric of our aocicty if ~ar should occur 
{italics nine). Third, ~&~&Ge to the civil 
societies of the alliance resulting from nuclear 
war could be very grave. Fourth, ir:iprovcd. non-
nuclo er forces, ncll ~ithin alliance rcsourccs 1 
could enhcncc detorrcnco of nny ngGrossive 
moves shgrt of direct, all out at ta.ck on i·ies tern 
Europc.6.> 
The second item is the point of interest to the 
student o.f deterrence. The idea is that a strategy 
could be devised to preserve the fabric of our society 
if war should occur. The Ymy to achieve this objective 
is,, according to l.rcNam17lra, to return to tbc precepts of 
war as they e~isted before the era of total war • 
. 
The United States has co~e to the conclusion 
thot, to the extent fe:::sible, basic military 
strategy in a possible senerel nuclear war 
should be approached in much the same W3.Y that 
6q.Dcpnrtment of State Bulletin "Defense Arrange-
ments of tho .Iforth n.tl.sntic (.;oz;-.r.iuni ty, r, by Robert s. 
J,fo!fonare, July 9, 1962, p. 66. ( 'Ihis is a reprint of 






more conventional military operations have been 
regarded in the past. That is to say, principal 
military objectives, in the event of o nuclcnr 
wnr stcr.trilin0 from e. r.iajor attack on the alli-
ance, should be the destruction of the enemy's 
milit~ry forces, not of his civilian popula-
tion. bb 
The position McNamara sets forth is rationo.l. 
Given the ability of either side to d~stroy the major 
urban centers of the opponent the advantage of such 
at tack is ca nee lle d out. Should war occur nuc-lc ar 
weapons could be used against military tBrgctz. A 
largo invulnerable reserve of arms would insure that 
tho adversary \'tould not be tempted to attack cities. 
Or, to use li!cl·~amara 1 s words: fl . . . we are giving a 
possible opponent the stronGest imaGinable incentive 
to refrain from striking our own cities. 1167 
McNamara 1 s p1~oposed solution to the strategic 
; j 
dilemma was not accepted by many interested parties or 
really fully accepted by the Secretary himself. General 
Andro~Bcaufre wrote: 
This extremely subtle solution has the advan-
tage of being logical. Its chief disadvantage is 
to announce that the ini tio.l res 9onsc vlill only 
be a shot ncross the bow,, so that certain actions 
r.iight be undertnkcn by tho ener::.y with limi tcd 
initial risk: thus nuclear deterrence loses a 
lnr6e part of its value. 1\nothor disadvantage is 
that in this atmosphere of cecla1~ed caution the 
threat of 'certain destruction' does not seer.i 
very plausible ns soon -as every one knm"i"s it will 




68 ,. And.re Ber-uf're, ;·""\T~ ~-::. :: .:u1•o:ic 
~~ ~~~~~
(l!cv: York: 1966 ), 
) 
There ~ere other argUr.tents against the no-cities 
target system. First, there arc few natural geographical 
barriers to help keep a nuclear war limited in Europe. 
Second, cities ore in many c2ses located near military 
targets. Third, cor.uuand and control over nuclear forces 
in a nuclear v:ar may be disrupted. Fourth, and most 
ir.iportant, the other side might not 11~lay bal1. 11 69 
A key clement in the utility of the ci.ty-sparing 
sti•a togy is the ''lillingness and/or ability of the Soviets 
to conduct a limited nuclear v:nr with the United States. 
In su1~voying the literature ono finds a distinction 
between limited conventional and limited nucleor war.?O 
A limited conventional ''tar in Europe would give consider-
able advantafe to the Soviets due to their mnssive con-
ventional st1•cngth. ~I.1he follo\·1inr; tables illus tr a tc tht! 
comparative non-nuclear force levels between the Wni•saw 
Poet and NATO nntions: 
Ground Formations (in division equivalents} 
Northern P-nd Central Eurooo 
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The mobilization co. µaci ty of the \"/arsP.w Pact is 
much greater than that of NATO. It hes b een estimated 
that the thirty-one Soviet divisions in Central Europe 
could be increased to seventy in less thnn thirty days. 
Also support and logistic situations o.re f2vorable to the 
Pact. The American airlift assui~cs e securo air environ-
ment and ability to lnnd without attack. In view of the 
shallow operation~l depth of Central Europe nnd the 
Soviet short-ra.nge rockets SS-3 and SS-4, the C-.5A airlift 
force would seem to lose a good deal of its military sig-
nificance. The Soviet anticipated rate of adv~nce across 
Europe in the event of a war is sixty kilometers µer day. 
At that rate they would be at the Channel in less than a 
\"1eek. 'lhe allied airports would be tarfeted and the sea-
lift \':ould arrive too late. Hence the only option open 
71Fir.ures from Tb.e l:ilitar;v Et'l~nce 1971-1Q72 
(London: 1971), · pp. 76-77. 
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to the A.~ericans according to the Soviet Union is a nuclear 
response. 
An equipnent comparison gives more support to the 
theory that Soviets would seek a rnpid conquest of :vestern 
Europe and the Americans would be forced to resort to 











in Southern Eurooe 







At the present tir.1e R:\TO is estimated to l:~ve 7, 000 
nuclear warheDds. These range from artillery ~nd short-
ran[;e r.tissiles to aircro:i't c!elivered KT Ranbe \'leapons. 
The Soviet Union has control of a 1'lir,1i ted 11 nucle~r v;ar-
head stockpile ·::hi ch nUMbers about 3, .500. 73 
In the Soviet vie\·: a European war '1ould inevitably 
' becor.1e a nuclear war bocau~e the .Americans v:ould have no 
other Rcceptable option. Current Soviet strategic thirJting 
on a European strategy z:i.ay be described as "counter center. 11 
The objective of this strategic doc t1•ine is to 11ei ther 
seize the enemy's terri tor:r or devastate his renr 11 (in 
72Ibid. 
73Ibid., p. 79. 
Soviet terminology a no. tion 1 s political and economic i'ounda.-
tion). 74 The Soviets always discuss a European r:ar in the 
conte:xt of a world war. In vie'.',' of the strong American 
response in Korea the Soviets are relatively certain the 
Americans would fight for Europe. The relative a.syrr.metry 
between the United States and the USSR t actical nuclear 
missile postures sur.gests that a limited nuclear v;ar could 
not lonG remrt.in limi tea in tcrr.i~ of r:eapons er~ploycd. 
11The postures a.re asYMJiletrical in both range and numbers 
o'f deli very vehicles and in the yields of' nuclear 
weapons • • rl • • 
If both sides P.re to play by the same rules, they 
~ust have the some equipment. Until then, if the Ameri-
c~ms, because of possible conventional force infcriori ty 
stemmi11g fror.i r2pid-mobiliz~tion capabilities of the 
Soviets, ini tiatod the use of nuclear v1capons at the 
lowest levels, the Soviets would have to respond alnost 
autonaticolly at a hiEher level because they do not pos-
sess matching yields et the sane levei. 75 
Ironically the American experience in the 1(orean 
and Southeast Asian conflicts ?:'lay have convinced the 
Soviets that Av.erican military policy is not absolutely 
cor.u~itted to unconditional surrender. '1.hat experience 
sur.gests that the United Ststes can accept limited vic-
tory or even defeat. 
74John R. Thaw.es, "Limited ~~uclear ~·far in Soviet 
Strategic ThinkinE;, 11 op. cit., p. 16. 
. 7 5 Ibid. I p • 19 • 
Despite \·:hnt the Soviets say about limited nucloar 
war certain facts remain. Both the United States ~nd the 
Soviet Union have an ~ssured destruction capacity. Both 
hold hostage cities of the other. ~'/hile some defensive 
measures could save lives on both sides neither super power 
has atteopted to limit possible darnag~. Any significant 
damage limiting atter:!?t would stimulate great offensive 
counterr1easures by the opposition. 
The clash o:f interests end ideologies which has 
divided the super powers will not soon end. The tactics 
of the Cold Viar may change but the general opposition of 
the two cultures and the possession of' the means of mutual 
snnihil€! ti on \•;ill continue to be major facts of 1 ife in 
the internnt ion1=1l system. Con.fl ic t will not suddenly end 
but it con be manared. The odds for survival i~prove as 
both super powers recognize the necessity of that cnnage-
ment. 
9 
IV. Compononts of American Defense Planning 
1. Introduction 
In ~nalyzing the entire range of American defense 
planni~.g one finds three distinct, though related, sets 
of questions. The first set deals with the basic assump-
tions of defense pla~~~ing. TI'lese include the concept of 
·ru ti on al dee is ion making arJong national optio!ls and assump-
tions about the international environment in which defense 
plaruiing ~ust operate. The second set of questions deals 
with the concept of national interest. These questions 
relate to the goals and objectives of foreign and defense 
policy. Few eroas of policy annlysis ere as importe.nt 
and yet as intellectually fuzzy es questions dealing ~ith 
the national interest. The last set of questions dee.ls 
Y1ith the concept of power or capabilities analysis. These 
quest ions are concerned i"li th evalua ti?'lb El state 1 s potential 
for action or reaction. The discussion of variables for 
determining national po•:rer must consider both pre-nuclear 
and nuclear condition·s. 
2. Assunptions of Streter-ic Pl~nning 
Defense planning in general and strategic planning 
111 particular must proceed upon assUiilptions of rationality 
of the various national actors. It is assumed that 
national nctors will act according to their own perceived 
self-interests consistent vri th the existing power si tua-
tion. That is, they will define their respective goals 
0 
or "interests," rank them in terms of import.once, cost, and 
risk, and then formulate policies that will r.inxirnize 
1 achieve~ent and minimize cost. At the sarae time the 
national actors vrill construct a similar calculus for their 
potential adversaries in order to anticipate when and where 
conflicts nay occur and the possible and probable intensity 
of these conflicts. 
Every historian is aware that nations do not always 
appear to act rationally. One scholar has suGgested three 
possible models of nationel decision making in crisis. 
(1) The rational process outlined above, (2) policy as the 
product bargaining £mong the elite, (3) policy as the 
2 
product of institutional pressure end/or values. I would 
suggest the application of the concept of "value-rational 
behavioru to cla1•ify this phenomenon. All behavior is 
based on values Yrhe ther tho y be tl:e v olues of ·an elite, o 
society, or a single man. \'.'hateve1• their source onco the 
values are articulated if the behavior carried out to 
achieve those values is rational, the policy itself is 
said to be rational.. The key to appearing retional is 
to act nslothers expect. This ele=ent of expected behav-
ior is vital to the conduct of nuclear age international 
relations. 
1 Charles J. Hitch and Roland U. McKeon, The Eco-
nor.tics of Defense in tho I1:uclear :'~r·e (Carnbridt;e: iiarverd 
University rress, l9bl), Chapter 7. 
2Gr2ho.ra T. Alli son, 11 Conceptl.tal !.!ode ls and the 
Cuban J1~issile Crisis, 11 A~:eric?.n Poli ti cnl Science ~cview, 
Septer:iber 1969. For discu::~::..on of" th~ Allis~:~ article 
see Davis B. Bobro~, Intcr~~tional R~ l n tio~s: ~ew 
Ap::>roQcb..es Ure..,·: York: The r'ree i'ress, 1972), pp. 37~4S. 
I 
v 
The models of policy as products of elite bargain-
ing and institutional ini'luence are therefore not neces-
h 11 1: J r1.r , ..... , 
sarily non-rational. In the process of f-ffilrni:ng goels are 
evaluated, poesibilities for success are exa~ined. Vested 
interests raay enter the calculations but if one is aware 
of these interests one can anticipat~ the goals and hence 
the policy. Si~ilarly, the institutional values of the 
great pov:ers may be determined. One can construct ari 
11 oporntional code" and thus anticipate policy.3 Though 
policy may be ini'luencecl by ccl!lpetition ornong components 
of the cli te and/or by the institutional structure in a 
given nation it may still be rational. 
Rationality as here used is ~eant to denote an 
eveluetive process rather than a norma tive judsccnt. If 
a nation's goals are consistent ~ith vita~ needs and 
rolntivo power the coals nre considered r a tional. If a 
policy r:-ioves toward ma.ximizint; tho goals at miniraizing 
cost the policy is said to be rational. 
It is expected that war as a national policy 
will be employed only to achieve sone goal. The utility 
of m1r in goa 1 achiever.tent; has chenfed in the modern ere. 
War for profit has become unprofitable. One noted econ-
omist put it this ·way: "A world that has unders toad 
~ 
3see Nathan Leite/ A Stud;r of Bols~cvis!':l 
(Glencoe: F1•ee Press, 1953) and Ooera.tio:-:nl Coco of 
the Poli~buro (now YorJ:: !.IcGraw-Hill, l')Sl). ;·/hile 
the L~itar ~pproach is based upon analysis of Soviet 
ideolOGY there are studies based upon conte7.t analysis 
of elite articulation. For exa~ple, J. D~vid Sinser, 
Soviet ar:d r'~eric<'ln Forcir:n ?ol:tc~:- At t itudes: A 
ConFer~t A:"Hl''.'3ic of ..:1itc .Art :!.cul:-. tio ::s \~!'!ins. Lske: 
U. s. !fo.va.l Ordnsn.ce 'I\:: sti1·:b Station, 1964). 
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Keynes and post-Keynesian economics has no need to conquer 
territory for the aa·ke of national economic gain. 114 !·;uclear 
\':eapons have even further decreased the utility of' r.i.ili tary 
power. Knorr .suggests the following formula: 
U = V - C: (V1 f v2 f .•• VN) - (Cl f Cz f ••. CN) 
Where U is tho Utility a nation may derive from cil-
itary po\·rnr; V, the Value of the foreic;n policy objectives; 
and C, the Costs involved, 11utility depends upon the dif1"'er-
ence between agc;regate values end agGree;ate costs. u.5 Given 
the economics of warfare it is usually in the interests of' 
the super pO\·:ers to attempt to gain their objective short 
of direct confrontation let alone by resorting to war. In 
order to conduct such complex policies it is necessary that 
nuclom• powers anticipate the actions and reactions of 
potential adversary stntes. This Anticipatory plannir~ 
ar.1ol1f_:; nuclear powers must as sur.:c re tionali t y . 
Defense planning also assumes that a state's power 
defines its position in the international system. Position 
refers to the range of options open to a nation in a given 
situation. The gr·eater the powe1, the more free don e. nation 
' has in securing the obj ec ti ves it deems vital. ~·,bere there 
is a potential conflict over a given set of objectives the 
nation with a clear preponderance of power v1ill st1•ive for 
the objective, while a nation \':ith no chance of' success 
4JUaus Knorr, On the Use of' r.:ilitary Po·::er in the 






'·rill not normally take on the venture. This is, however, 
a very simplistic example. For one thing power ~s local, 
that is, it does not exist in absolute abgregates but 
rather must be capnble of being i'ocused at a given ploce 
and time. Also, en objective is rarely of equal value 
to competing states. Usually one state will be ~·tilling 
to spend or risk more than another even i£ the latter 
stato ha~ more nsgregato power. It ia when t~cre exists 
a syrnrnetry of power and desires that conflicts develop 
into wars. 
Given the importance oi' power in international 
relations, the measurement and evaluation of power becomes 
a crj.t ical factor in policy ris.ldng. The question of whet 
constitutes pm·:er in the international system is not simple. 
The more specific que:::tion as to \'1ha t cons ti tut cs po·::er in 
a given conflict situation is even more difficult. In some 
situations po'.':er may be measured in terms of oegatons of 
nuclcer energy, missiles on tar&et, or nw~bers of armed 
men. In other situations G'UP, geography, adr.linist1~ative 
or political control or even ideas· and belief syster::s are 
vital factors in the power calculus. 
Another assumption of defense planning is that 
conteoporary international relations is a systematic 
process; that there exists an international system. 
Essentially this assumes that there are few randor.i ele-
ments in the international system; that cause and effect 
relationships may be observed or inferred. These assump-
tions are ultimately based upon the concept of 
95 
rationality discussed earlier. 
The international systcc nay be seid to be rational 
in terms of being goal oriented and power directed. How-
ever, the different perception of interests and evaluation 
of po':;er position transforr:is this relatively simple model 
into a very conplex reality. Tile constantly changing sit-
uations in the international system add still more diffi-
culty. 
This element of change in the conduct of inter-
na tionel relations constitutes a very important character-
istic of the international system. An infinite nur:iber of 
events occur to chal1be relationships among the national 
actions. 'Iheso events range from tcchnolot_:ical inventions 
to the rise ar.d .foll of political elitesJ to successful or 
unsuccensi'ul crop hnrvests. 
Another important characteri::tic of the inte11 -
national ~yetern is tho elewent of interdependence. Given 
the structure of the system no single nation is totally 
independent. Unintentionally, acts of one state may 
affect other states. ·The more powerful the national actor 
the greater the influence of· its actions will be. It is 
an ironic situation of the twentieth century that the 
most po•::erful states find themselves constrained by their 
own power. 
The international ~ystern herein described depends 
upon a constant, objective, COiw.!r.:Unications netuork cap-
able of transmitting information about the £Oals end 
probable courses of action of the v~rious national actors. 
This comr.tunications process involves both formal and informal 
sectors· of the Governments involved. The process and its 
concomitant assumptions about expected behavior constitute 
the "operational code 11 of modern national defense systems 
attempting t? oanage international crises. One scholar 
summarized the process in the followil"'..g way: 
A stable deterrence relationship demands a 
sophisticated and continuing exchange of siGnals 
e.nd a reliability of cxpectstions, ns well.as 
so~e approxir.ate qualitative and quantitative 
parity in weapons sys ter.ls Dnd rnili tary tech..."".!.ol-
ogy. As accurate an image as possible of the 
other nation 1 s ope1•atior:al code can help stabil-
ize the deterrent relationship. The more accur-
ately each perceives the othez•, the less likely 
either is to develop the 1 ~rong 1 ~eapon syste~s, 
to stockpile an inappropriate quantity of herd-
waro, or to deploy ~en or ~atorial in a manner 
that is provocative rather than deterrent.b 
The second. set oi' questions relevant to defense 
planning involved the concept of po\'ler. \','e now turn to 
an exacination of that concept. 
3. The Conceot of Power 
The evaluation of the national power of possible 
adversaries has become a rr.eans for defining defense 
. ~ 
objectives. Since 1961 the Ar.1erican defense budget has 
begun \"Ii th an analysis of the external threat. The most 
salient aspect of threat analysis is that it is based 
upon what the potential adversary .£.£!! do rather than on 
what he 1aay intend to do. One reason for this reliance 
in threat a~~lysis is simply that it is easier to ceasure 
6'Illomas \'I. J;iilburn in the foreword to J. David 
Singer, Studies in Detcrl'erce VII Soviet and A::erica~ 
Foreirn Policv ~ttitu~e~: A C~ntc~t A~elvsis of El~te 
Articulation. 
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capability than intent. IQaus Y\.llorr has '.':ri tten: 
• • • there ore fairly accurate indices of some deter-
rninents of nilitary potential. The size and structure 
of population, or the capacity for proC.ucing fuel and 
steel, or the dependence of nations on fo~ei£n food 
supplies anC. industrial materials ••. • f 
To deter:-:line pm·1er capabilities is to significantly reduce 
the nrea of uncertainty as to Tihat a nation will or will 
not do. In any state, capabilities inf'luence the defini-
ti on of goals. Honco the analysis of po\·1or may give 
indications of probable policy decisions. On the other 
hand possessing the capability to do a certain thir.g does 
not necessa1•ily mean a state r;ill use that potential. 
The Americans had a nuclear ~onopoly in the early fifties. 
They did not exploit it. Other nations have possessed 
advanta~es which they did not press. Ho\•:ever, to plan 
usine; capabilities or pot ential ns the nole critc1~ion is 
to envision the \':orst pos s ible contingency. One is assttr.l-
ing that intentionn will be pushed to the very limit of 
national pov1er. Worst case plannir.g can give one a lir.1-
ited and paranoid view of the world, contributing to 
unnecessary hostility, . and e110rl:ious defense e.=-:pendi tures. 
Ideally, of course, pl anning ,should proceed in tcr~s 0£ 
both enemy inte?!.tions end capabilities. 
For many ye ars the analysis of national po~or has 
been central to the study of interno.tior..al politics. How-
ever there is a distinction between traditional and con-
temporary criteria of national po\':er. The tradi tiona.l 
7Klaus !"~arr, The ~"!er Potential of !·TF.tions 
(Princeton: ?rinco ·i;vn l:nivcrsity .?rcssJ 19.36), p. 49. 
) clements of national power include: 
(1) Geography; including tho size, accessibility of 
the territory, climatic conditions, position with regard to 
po'm?rful neighbors and barriers to transportation and com-
munications. 
(2) Population; quantity nnd ~uality. The quality 
of a population refers to its utility as a potential po~cr 
source. Are the people orGenized? Are they capable of 
sustained effort? Do they possess teclmoloGicel and sci-
entific skills? 
(3) Economic support bese including natural 
resources, industrial ple.nt, dis tribu ti on and communica-
tion facilities, and financial and commercial stability. 
C4) r.Iilitar:r po•::e1"; including size of the forces, 
equipment, mo1•ale, training , a..--id leadership. 
(5) Poli tical-adminis tra ti ve control systct1. This 
includes the ability to inspiro the wass of the people in 
a national effort; the ability to 11!.ake and e.xecuto deci-
sions; and the ability to r.iainto.in effecti vo comr.iu...--iica tion 
snd control over all sectors or the political system. 
The nuclear abe has altered the relative value of 
several of the traditional elenents of nntional power. 
For exanple, geography is still an important factor in 
terms of size and clir.iate, etc., but a new C.im~nsion has 
been added called "absorbtion capacity." That is sheer 
eeographical size as related to the ability of a nation 
to absorb one or r.ior e nuclear strikes. In order to 
9S 
) pos~oss a credible second strike a nation must be 2ble to 
survive a massive first strike. Nat i ons of limited geo-
graphical size have a [reat disadvantage in this respect. 
Japan, tho United Ki:rlg dom, France, West Germany, or Israel 
si~ply could not absorb the nu.~bers of thermonuclear explo-
sions that the United States, USSR, Canada, China, or other 
continental nations could. Other geographical factors such 
as distribution of population, prevailinB climate patterns, 
and soil characteristics could also have an importance in 
nuclear war which they did not have previously. 
While population continues to be a source of national 
power the character of democratic political systems and the 
influence of the ma~s ~cdia have modified the value of this 
f'actor. In recent A.'?lorican e:xpcr•ienccs popular dissent 
even by distant 1~i!1ori ties has constrained the Ar.te r i c€n 
political leadership end actually weakened the power posi-
tion of the nation. One foreign observer has noted: 
\'lhils t the freedom to der.1onstra.te--even f or 
defeatism in foreign policy--is clearly one of' 
tte strengths of a free society it i~ als o one 
of its ~eak~esses so fer as oner ool5ttcs is 
concern!3d. 
Tho foreign observer went on ' to point out that free s pe ech 
is a vital component in a tler.1ocretic system; that in the 
long run it alone can reGulate domestic politics. But 
free speech " • • . is not necessarily a prime st~eng th in 
the conduct of foreign policy in the short term, especially 
8Edmund Ions, ''Dissent in .:'lt-:lerica: The Constraints 





against adversaries \'Jho are not checked by opinion at home. 119 
A population must be corn::ii tted in order to be a con-
tribution to national po\·1er. The American experience in both 
Korea and Vietna.ra suggests the inability of the American pub-
lie to sus te.in cor.i.r.ii tment to a long, lii~i te d war. Hence the 
Americans 1 potential for enga&:ing in l_imi ted war is somewhat 
dirninisl: ed as are the options of the Preeident. A potential 
adversary knowing this c~n exploit it. 
The economic base also continues to be e vital ele-
rnent in the calculus of national poVler. In fighting a lim-
itcd but protracted war or in meintsining a po~er position 
in a Cold \kr arms race, the economic strength could be 
decisive. However the difference in American doCcnse pol-
icy in the nuclear age in that we can no longer de pend upon 
a strateg y of mobilization. In past wai•s the United Stutes 
was largely unprepa1•ed but '.':as able to mobilize after the 
conflict began. Given the nature of modern weapons sys-
terns the strategy of mobilizetion has been replaced by the 
strategy of deterrence. Tile problem is to have an economic 
system· that can maintc in a C.e terrent posture fo1• the long 
haui. 10 
The other elecents of national pm·ier are essen-
tielly the sar.ie as they were before the nuclea1• age. Sci-
ence and technology h3ve long been important factors, 
though in the nuclear age the rate end scope of 
9rbia., p. 12. 
lOThis wr-s e r.-iajor concern of the Eisenhower adr.:in-
istretion snd a j~stificstion for the New Look strate~y. 
See Se?:<uel :.: • Euntinrton, Tb~ Co:-:~:on De fc:-ise: Strri te r:ic 
Pro !:ra!"' s in :;~ :-: ;. ~ l Defc ':'se (::o·;; Yor~:: volu:;.bia vni v~r-




technological change is increasing. Leadership and 
poli tical-adn1inistrativ e control continue to be vital 
though the modern aee seems to demand Greater speed in 
polit i cal decision naking. 
The final component of defense planning to be dis-
cussed here is national interest. ,;.:e turn now to that 
rather enigmatic subject. 
4. Goals of k 1ericen Rational Security Policy: The 
National Interest 
Perhaps the most difficult and yet i~portant aspect 
in American defense plci.nning is the deterr.iination of 
national goE?ls. V!hat are \':e for or against? What detsr-
Mines our 11 intorests 11 and what makes them vital? How cen 
we undorstanl t ho process of valua tion? Be they explicit 
or hic cien, si?:!ple or cor.1plex the United Sta tc s Government 
does choose values, r:J.ab.~s them into objectives nnd the 
sur11 totnl of the· ne object:i.ves at any given tir.1e r.iey be 
called the National Interest. 
For many years scholars have baen atter.!ptirg to 
define· the national or public interest. I·.Iost of these 
efforts heve f a iled because ~ philosophical, socio-
logical, or historical analysis of goals cannot produce 
an operational definition of the national interest. 
Vlhenever one arr,ues for an operational definition 
of the national interest there is a danGer that this 
position will degenerato into the realist-idealist debate. 
The realists arguing that only power or "herd data 11 can be 
considered and the idealists t1aintainir1g that the essence 
1( 
of the American national interest is its commitment to ccr-
tain transcendent ideas. Theref'ore \·:e seek an operational 
definition that will include both concerns. In order to do 
this it may be necessar~ to approach the problem not in 
terms of volues but of needs. 
Several contemporary social scientists have made 
important contributions to the General study of values by 
attempt.ins to define and structui,e hun~an needs. Clyde 
Kluckholr.i. has arbued that there are three levels of hun:an 
needs: the physiological, the social, and the individual. 
In the field of psychology David UcClelland has SUGgested 
four basic needs: protection and support, cxpres~ion and 
ref;ulation f'or effect, mas tc1• y of external r;orld, self-
di rection nr.d con~rol. P.o~cvcr one of the most import~nt 
sche1~a for the stuct:r of values has been C.cvelopcd by 
Abrahar.i H. J.la slow. 11 Essentially 1.:aslo,·1 has a ttcr::p ted to 
construct what he calls a needs hierarchy. The hierarchy 
has five levels: Level one is the survival need. This 
refers to the need or instinct for physical self-
prcservntion. Level t-;,·o is the safety or s~curity need. 
This is protection frolll natural or ma.n-r.~ade th1•eat. 
Level three is the social need for bclongness or love. 
Level four is the need for esteem, to have others think 
well of you. Level five refers to the need for gro\':th 
and self-actualization. \'1hile most of these theories 
11Abraharn li. J,~aslow, Tor:ard e i'sycholocy of 
Being (New :C.ork: Von !\a strand, 1965). 
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refer to individual or group action in the valuation process 
they nay provide inslght for the process of national-
intere~ t valuation. 
National security po1icies are means for achieving 
necessary or desirable ends. The implementation of' any 
strater,y requires expenditure of vsst sUl~S of money and 
at times lives, involves f rave risks and at times t;reat 
ef'forts. Thus a strntery involves an e:i'=penditure of 
values, hence strater,ic decisions are essentially exper-
iences in judging the relative i~portence of certain 
values. rJe must presume that some values nre more il':lpor-
tant than others. Eence we would spend fifty or seventy 
billion dollars on defenne because we feel we need secur-
ity more than v:e need the other opportuni tics .foret;one by 
the defense expcndi ture. Tl-:.c quc ~tion t hen becor:os one 
of determin~ng the re la t5. ve importance of' nee cs. \"/hat is 
the criterion for rnakint; such a deter:;:ination? I •,·;ould 
argue that hlsslow 1 s needs hierarchy approach can be ~edi­
fied to be relevant to the natio11nl interest valuation 
process. 
Let us look at the basic needs of the United States. 
Surely the most basic is to exist, to continue to exist. 
Hence one of tte first neecs and thus objectives of national 
security policy is the prevention of' s nuclear attack upon 
the United States. A second need or objective is the pro-
tection of' the "vital interests 11 of the United States. The 
uord vital is here used to convey e ranse of interests upon 
·which the existence and character of Amerio an society 
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depends. A third need level or category would be the main-
tenance of' Anerican global intere s ts '"'hich may bs defined as 
interc£ts nhich are cecr:icd i mportant to the economic-
political condition in the United Sta tes but which are of a 
lower ranGe of importance than the 11 vi tal 11 interests. Thus 
f'nr Y/e have three ~ets of s ecurity needs or coals: 
(1) Prevention of nuclear attack upon the American 
nation 
(2) Protection of American vital interests, e.g. 
population1 territory, economic end political 
systems, the value syste m1 and the military 
and military support power bese 
(3) 1;'.aintenance of the global interests of the 
United States, e.g. strate~ic b~lance 1 alli-
ance structure, international trade structure, 
etc. 
The parallel with Maslow•s n eed hierarchy is f'airly 
clear. His Level 1, survival, can be equated with our 
category 1 p1~evention of nuclear atteck upon the United 
States. His level 2, safety and .security, par8llels our 
category 2 protection of American vital interests. His 
levels 3 nnd 4, belongingness and esteem, are social needs 
and can be equated with desirable relations arnong nations 
as in our category 3 maintenance of the global interests 
of the United States. J.iaslow 1 s le.st category1 need for 
growth and self-actualization, is not perceived by the 
United States to be primarily a function of ~ilitary pol-
icy. The linit1;1d States coes not need physical gro\·:th or 
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seli'-actualization throueh conquest. Our military policy 
is conceived to be cefen3:ive in nature. rle currently view 
self-actualizotion to lie in tho realm of do~estic self-
fulfillment and life-enrichment. 
In order to use these goal sets in a systematic 
analysis we must further dof'ine end rank them. If policy 
objectives are to have an operational utility they must 
be ranlrnd and priorities :aust be established.. What fol-
lows is a tentative rankin5 of the ccntrel goals of Ame1•-
ican national security policy: 
Goals of American National Security ?olicy 
I. 1. Prevention of Spasm Nucle a1• \'Jar { Pv S!iV/} 
(Pv C-VA) 
{Pv C-FA) 
2. Prevention of Countervalue Attack 
3. P1•evc11tion of Counterf'orce At tacl-; 
II. 4. .Protection of Anericon Population {Pt-pop. ) 
III. 
5. Protection of Ar-.erican Territory {Pt-tor.) 








Economic System {Pt-p) 
Protection of American Value Systcr- {Pt-val} 
Protection ·or American ·J.tilitary and 
Support 
i:aintenance of NATO Alliance 
Maint.enance of Hemispheric Security 
J.Iaintenance of lt!id dle Ea.st Be lance 
of ?o\·:er 
Maintenance of Balance of Power in 
Asia 








(M-Af. I. sec} 
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) As one descends the scale in table I the relative 
v:orth of the seals d~clines. Hence, one \7ould be willing 
to modify or trcde-off lesser Goals for more ir.iportant ones. 
lioYiever a.11 goals are negotiable to e point. Given contin-
c;encie s nay ce.11 for trade-offs. For example, vrhile the 
choice between the ;:>rotection of NATO allies and the protec-
tion of American population seems at first clear, American 
lives huve bc{?n spent to protect HATO allies in the past 
and ~ight in tho future. It is a matter of eegree. Sone 
Ame1•ican territory and/or population mir;ht be traded-off' 
in order to sec~re ~reatcr safety for the rest of the nation. 
A policy maker might have to decide, for instance, between a 
lirJi ted nuclear exchans;e co~ ting 20 million li vos and a 
total nuclear wor costing 180 million lives or mo1'e. Hence 
even vital co~tls are neGotiable in the nuclear Ef;C. 
S. Deterrence as an Influence Prcce~s 
Deterrence is the ability to influence so1~~eone .!221 
to do socething. Positively it is persuasion. Negatively 
it is threat. Glenn Snyder has defined deterrence as a 
"species of political poi'!er, 11 having the "capacity to induce 
' 
others to do thin;s or not to do thinbs which they \"iould not 
other\·;ise do or ref'r£in fro!n doing. 1112 John R. Raser has 
noted: "At its sir.iplest, deterrence is a means of control-
ling other's behavior by the threat of pW1ishr:.:ent. It is a 
12Glenn H. Snycer, 11Deterrnnce end PoV!er, 11 Journ~l 
of C::r·;.f'l..:ct :1·~ ~- 0lut:.c !~ , Vol. IV, No. 2, June 1960, p. lo3. 
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ubiqui taus pheno::1E:non which obviously '';o:rlm. ul3 
t 
Ithielj\ de 
Sola .Pool rejects the obvious v alue of' deterrence b~sed on 
threat. He agrees that deterrence is "a special c a se of' 
ini'luence" but arc_:ues that deterrence theory should either 
be "conrruent '\'lith ex istins theories of influence or should 
specify the reason for its diverrence. 11 This scholar also 
cites that 11r.iost psycholoc:;ical experir.1ents seem to shot1 
feer -to be a relatively ineffectual force for persuasion. ul4 
Thomas W. l.lilburn ar£ucs for both a negative deter-
rence and "at the se. rne tir.ie de terr.lining posi tivoly through. 
increasing the pay-off c~nd the likelihood of success to 
them) for every step in other eirections . II He fur-
ther maintains that this v:ould seem in accord with learn-
ing and decision theory. 15 The point here is that deter-
rence is a very complex process. In the recent past in the 
field of nationnl security affairs deterrence has dependec 
upon threat. However, evidence from other I'ields sus6ests 
the possibility of more positive optlons as the inter-
national situation chances. 
Since 1945 nuclear deterrence has become a major 
element in strategic plannir;ig. Nuclear deterrence depends 
,/ 
v 
13John R. Raser, uDetei•rencc Research: Past Proeress 
and Future Heeds" (China Lake: U. S. Naval Ordnance Testini; 
Station, Contract No. N60530-11242). 
14Ithier do Sola Pool, Strn:!ics in Deterrence (Project 
~ichclson); Dater~ence ~s rn InI'lucnce ~r0ccss (China Lake: 
.U. S. 1;aval Ordnence ·.resting :Station, l9b5 ), p. J. 
15Tho1:-:as ·.v. !.iilburn, "~·rnat Constitutes Effective 
Deterrence?" Journal of Co::-iflict ~esolution, Vol. III, 1;0. 2, 
pp. 138-144. Also see :.!ilburn's Stt.~ C:ies in Doterrence 
(Project !.:ichelson), Dcsi:n for the 5ti.:d...- of f::;;to1':ient 







ubiquitous phenor.1enon Yth1.ch obviously works. ul3 Ithie~ de 
Sola Pool rejects the obvious value of deterrence based on 
threat. He agrees that deterrence is 11a special case of 
influence" but argues that deterrence theory should either 
be 11 conrruent •;Ii th existing theories of influence or should 
specify the reason for its diver~enc~. 11 This scholar also 
cites that 11mos t psychological experir.1ents seem to show 
fear to be a relatively ineffectual force for'· persuasion. 1114 
Thomas W. ~.:ilbui,n arr,ues for both a negative deter-
rence and "at the same tir.!e deter:!ining positively through 
increasing the pay-off (end the likelihood of success to 
~her.i) for every step in other directions • II He fur-. . . 
ther mnintains that this would seem in accord with learn-
. 1.5 ing and decision theory. The point here is that deter-
renca is a very co1::iple.x process. In the recent pa st in tho 
field of n a tional security affnirs deterrence has depended 
upon threat. However, evidence from other .fields sur;e;ests 
the possibility o"I' r:iore positive options as the inter-
national situation chances. 
Since 1945 nuclear dete :i·11 eince has become a rno.jor 
element in strategic plcnning. ?iucleer deter1•ence depenc s 
13John R. Raser, 11Dete1•rencc Research: Post P:ro f ress 
and Futui•e Heeds" (China Lake: U. S. Naval Ordnance Testinc; 
Station, Contract No. N60530-11242). 
14rthier de Sole. Pool, Studies in Deterrence (Project 
~ichelson); Deter~ence os ~n Influence Proc e ss {C h ina Ls kc: 
U. S. Naval Ordnance ·I1esting Station, 1965), p. 3. 
l.5Thor.:as ·.v. !.al burn, 11·:rnat Cons ti tut es Effective 
Deterrence?" Journ~l of Conflict ;:{e!Jol ution, Vol. III, No. 2, 
pp. 138-1!~4· Also see :.:11ourn' s St1.1dics in Deterr~nce 
(Project ?.:ichelson), Desirn for the St~ dv of .::ete r r ent 







exclusively upon fear . Notwithstanding the evidence from 
psychology end learning theory the tlevelopcent of nuclear 
deterrence has become the basis of stability in an extre~ely 
unstable environr1ent. One of the destabilizing elements of 
the contemporary international system has been technologi-
cal chenge. Ironically it has not been the teclm.ology of 
nuclear weapons \'/hich has brour;ht about instability in the 
nuclear balance. Rather it hes been the devel9pment of 
16 intercontinental delivery systeres. 
Deterrence is not a thing or a stage to be achieved, 
rather it is an on-r,oing conmunications process. It is 
dynamic and relative with respect to ectors and situa-
tional context. It is subject to chan£ing r.lobel condi-
tions, techno) OGical dcvelop1:.cnts, breakthroughs in 
weapons systems, shifts in the economic ba[;e of the nation 
which must support the defense program, nnd changes in the 
political-administrative leadorship which ~ust direct it. 
Among nation states dete1•rence is essentially a 
political process in that it is an attempt to influence 
or control another actor. It is asstL~ed to be r,oal-
rational. It is usually negative terms, that is, it 
seeks to prevent a given act. Prevention of an act 
requires power, hence the study of deterrence is a form 
of power analysis. Though po\•.rer is the substance behind 
deterrence its actual use in armed conflict meens that 
lbAr 1 • Jr 
no a ·~· 
Ste.ble Deterrence," 
Vol. IX, No. 3, pp. 
Kuzrnack, "Technolof:ical Cho!"..fe and 
Journel of Uonflict Resolution, 
309-317. 
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() deterrence has failed. Thus in deterrence the application 
oi' power is limited to threat. 
~reat analysis therefore constitutes a large part 
of the study of deterrence. The threat must be credible, 
and must be able to influence the other ector by fear of 
punishment for a given act or by fear of failure in e given 
undertaking. Glenn Snyder refers to this as c!eterrence by 
denial and punish~ent. 
In r.iilitary affairs deterrence by denial is 
acconplished by having military forces l'ihich can 
block the enemy's military forcez from nakin~ 
ter1•i toriRl gains. Deterrence by punishr.:ent 
grants him the Gein but ceters by posinG the 
prospect of war costs greater than the velue of 
the gain.17 
o- Elsewhere Snyder distinbU:ishes deterrence from defense. 
0 
He v:ri tes: 
The centrnl Theoretical ?roblcm in the field 
of National Sccurit-y ~olicy is to clarify and dis-
tinGuish betv;een the t~·:o central concepts of c10ter-
rcnce end ~efense. Essentially, deterrence means 
discourag ini; the eneny from taking milit~ry action 
by posing for hin a prospect of co8t end risk out-
weic;hing his prospective fain. DeJ'ense w;:ans 
reducing our ovm prospective costs and risks in 
the evont deterrence fails. Deterrence works on 
encm:.; intentions . • • • Defense reC:uces8 tl~e ene-my's capability to damere or deprive us .1 
Snyder v:ould agree ,.,i th the broader definition of deter-
rence. He ar~ues that "deterrence is a function of the 
total cost-gain expectations of the party to be 
deterred •••• nl9 Several scholars have constructed 
l 7 Glenn H. Snyder, ''Deterrence and Por:er, 11 ..Q£.. 
cit., p. 163. 
18G1 enn H. Sn ycer, _n_e"""t'--ie..-r"""r_e;....;!"-..c_e_- -"'-~n~d_D_,,e,..;;;f_.c~n ..... s_e_: _T--==o~"'~~-r_d 
a 'I'heor;r of [:-- t ional Se curi t ;r ( ir inceton: .t""Jl'incc ton Uni ver-
si ty ?ress, 1961), p. 3. 




models of the deterrence process. These models are in the 
form of a rational calculus comparing goals, objectives, 
and costs. Snyder argues that the potential cost of ene~y 
acts rnay be divided into two sets: intrinsic or end val-
ues end power or instru.-:;ental values. He concludes: 
• • • the total value of a response • • • is 
the sur.i of the pov:er values and in tr ins ic values 
which can be saved or rained by the response, 
minus the poncr vclues untl intrinsic values lost 
es the result of war casualties End dauage.20 
In any si tl.l at ion there is a wide ranee of de tor-
rent sti,ategies frora which a policy maker may choose. The 
ran~e of his options is a function of power, position, 
weapons system, domestic support, and a host of other 
things. To be suro, his choice should be conditioned as 
Snyder ond others· point out by the value of the objectives 
and the cost and risk of actinc; or not actinc;. Ye t the re 
are other considerations that may als o play an i mportant 
part in the decision. Power io local and one stnte raay 
I 
have more total po~er but not have it at the right place 
at the rit;ht tit'le. Or a. military comni tr.1ent to secu1,e 
one objective could leave one in a \-:eakened position to 
dei'end a ?:'lore valuable objective else•:.here. A deterrence 
calculus \"1hich approaches the state of becor.ling a general 
theory is danGerous and coo~ed to failure because the var-
iables and the context of national security chonfe so 
quickly. All one can do to rnake intellir.ible t·:hat Y:ould 
20Ibid., pp. 31-33 .. ;lso ~ee Glir:t::n F. F:_n!~, 
11 '"""re Colcui ~ • ~ o ........ "- 'L) .... , ,+- , , ,,. .... "'I'""'•"'~"" 11 ... · t- ..... •·· ~ r-._f' (; ...... , • • "'1 _ _ ~ ct J•• -' - «; "'- ... ~ .. ....,""""'._. _ ..., ._,.,, -"¥·•"""''°') .;;.'-'...;;.V..;_•~·..;..· ..;..-...=-'-~--=---~;....;._~-





otherv1ise be intellectual cha os is to first, assume nations 
act according to their perce ptions of their self-interest 
and second, attempt to under s tand their operational code, 
por:or position, n a tional needs and objectives. Deterrence 
strateGy, then, is determine d not by the analysts but by 
the environ!"lent in v:hich that policy develops. That 
environr1ent includes the dor.1estic sector of each actor 
as well es the interna tional sector as a •:.;hole. 
6. StrateFiC Options 
In view of the politicEl realities of the American 
democratic process, the nature of the Cold \'!er, the atti-
tude of the American public tonard the r::ilita.ry, and the 
dcvelopn!ent of nuclear \·:eapons sys ter.;s, there are cur-
rently three ~cncral sets of strateries available to Amer-
ican defense planners. These are ccnial, punish~cnt, ~1d 
mixed strategies. The denial strategies are built arcund 
the use of lm1 ge convcntionE!l .forces. The1~0 is some tlis-
pute a.s to whether oi-• not these forces may be armed with 
llnited tactical .nuclear weapons. The Soviet literati.<rc 
argues that the enployr.1ent pf such \·:eapons wot1ld escalate 
the conflict out of the conventional ranee. The Americen 
strate[:ists disagree. I will essuce that denial f'orces 
could enploy nuclear weapo!'.s in such a manner so as to 
deny the objective to e. \vould-be aggressor and yet not 
attempt to punish him bJ· destro:IinG his homeland. 
The punishment strategies rely al~tost entirely 





by ini'licting unncceptable damage on the ar.Rress~r 1 s homeland. 
The most complete statc~ent of the punish~ent strate6ies was 
r.1ade by John Foster Dulles in his instant ~nd r.1a.ssive retali-
ation ~octrine. Before the Soviets achieved nuclear suffi-
ciency the central probi~m of defense plenning had been one 
of selecting nn appropriate torret system to insure deter-
rence. The concept used to ~easurc tne effectiveness of a 
(// 
detorrcnce system has been the assured destruction capacity 
(hereafter A.D.C.). The A.D.C. has been defined by Secre-
tary UcHe.inara o.s the "ability to inflict nt all tin~es and 
under all foreseeable conditions an unacceptable dc~ree of 
dam2r,e upon any arrrressor--even after abso1~bing a surprise 
attacl:. 1121 The criteria as to what constitutes sufficient 
assured cc struc tio_n capacity is a crdttedly subjective. 
How much destruction is sufficient to deter? In World r.'ar 
II the Soviets suffered 10~ population destl'uc:tion \':ithout 
surrendering. Currently it is o s sur"!!ed the. t the capacity 
to de~troy 3a(o of the Soviet popula tion and 50% of their 
industry is sufficient to deter thee £rom leunching a 
nuclear strike on the United States. 
Mixed strate;;:ies are atter.:pts to er.:ploy either or 
both c:enial nnd punishr.!cnt tectics F.S the eituation v:ar-
rants. These require both conventional and nuclear forces 
and a flexible attitude on the part of policy makers. 
Tho1•e is always a danger that a ndxed stratef;y will lose 
2lst2terr:ent b · Secretnr'V of Defense !:•cl'i?:--:?.ra on 
FY l(}MC') j'l"~· .. 1·~ .. ~ 'I , r1 :: .=- 1 '!(-- t ·~ ·4 t. sl:l !"'; t :!: : tJ. S. L~-.,·""1:.-
: .. cnt .L"r·il~tir::. i;; VJ..i.'ico, 19cv}, pp. 5t>-59. 
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) its lir.tited nnd controlled character under the pressure of 
war and the demand for victory. 
The choice of which set of stratet;ies is employed 
in the pursuit of national security has startling conse-
qucnces in Arr.erican foreign~ domestic policy. For 
exnr.:ple if the United States ·•:ere car.uni tted to a denial 
stratei;y a Soviet move into Western Europe would need to 
be countered by a large land force using conventional 
weapons and requirint; sustained air and sealift and other 
support facilities. In order for this force to be ot' suf-
ficient size so as to deny the Soviets their objective 
the United States would have to maintain a ;;iuch lcrger 
s tandinr; e.ri;iy than at any time since 1945. Also larGcr 
-
nur.1bc1,s of Ar.ie1~ican troops would need to be garrisoned in 
Europe. The domestic e.ffects of these policies would 
include lar0cr defense budgets, continuinG b Dl e nce of pay-
ment deficits, and a hose .of othc1, problems. 
·-· 
Ii' on the other hand ~ punish.~ent strategy '':ere 
chosen a Soviet move into :vestern Europe \';ould be countered 
by a r.1as si ve nuclear strike a gainst Soviet tar&e ts. This 
in turn would invite a nuclear st1,il:e on the A.r:i.erican 
homeland. 'Ihe constraints facing the policy mDker in the 
first instance are mainly economic and political, in the 
second national survival. 
For many social, political, and economic reasons 
'(which have been discussed in pa.rt I of this paper) 
Ame1•ican policy rna!:ers since the end of \'iorld i'iar II 
have sole cted punishr.:ent str2 tec:;ies. This \':as fee.si ble, 
1 11 
credible, and relatively economical during the period of 
American ato1~ic and nuclcor superiority 1945-55. The pun-
ishr.!ent s t1·a tcries ' ·:ere hm·rnver provoca ti vo, spurring an 
arms ro.ce nhich brought the Soviets to clear nuclear par-
1 ty in 1969. 22 As noted in ceses of medium aggression or 
before, ,.,i th parity, punishment credibility declines. 
The threat of Massive nuclear retaliation failed to deter 
Horth Korea or !forth Vietnam end only et the brink of 
holocaust deterred the Russians from placinG nussilcs in 
Cuba. It has become clear to all that too Great a reli-
ance on punish!:'lent strategy is no longer acceptable. 
The solution is not simply to switch to denial 
stratcr;ies. Each set has rather serious i'laws. 
Pure denial stratcc;ies hnve the follo\':ing draw-
backs: 
1. Conventional forces are very expensive to train 
and maintain, much more expensive than nuclear forces. 
2. Conventional forces are also very unpopular. 
The Ar.1erican nation is intolerant of peacetime drsfts end 
large standing armies. A large professional a~~y itself 
might conntitute a sociel-pol~ticnl risk. Indeed there 
are many v:ho doubt that a der.iocracy can long survive as 
a quasi-garrison state. 
3. Denial strategies would require large nw~bers 
of American troops abroad. This brings on a host of prob-
lems such as balance of payr.:ents, garrison incidents, and 






4. Public opinion in a cemocracy is not likely to 
support a lir.1i tec.1 conventional rrnr of long duration. This 
is at leest partially exemplified by the Vietnar.1 experience. 
5. Finally, the Soviet and Chinese nuclear capabil-
ities detract fro~ the sufficiency of reliance on conven-
tional force. It stands to reason that in any ultimate 
conflict the probability is rreat that nuclear ~eapona 
would be used (to avoid eefeat) and the conventional 
forces thereby rendered impotent. 
These considerations constitute very significant 
constraints upon reliance on denial strategies. 
On the other hand punishr~ent .stratcric s also have 
drawbnclcs : 
l. While ptU1ish:¥,ent stratcries are less expensive 
and demand fnr less in manpo~er end hence in political 
capital, they are infinitely more dans erous than denial 
strategies. Should denial deterrence fail a conventional 
vmr might ensue \':hich v:ould be unfortunate, but not ca ta-
s trophic. On the other hand, if r>unishr::ent deterrence 
.feils a nuclear v:ar might re.sul t \'lith a range of daoage 
extending from the stone a5e to oblivion. 
2. Nuclear deterrence alone does not E;ive the 
policy maker sufficient flexibility to act in a crisis 
and once the nuclear threshold is crossed the1•e is even 
less eecision-roor.1 for ~aneuver. 
3. Nuclear deterrer.ce does not aetcr below the 
llf 
level of a general attack on the United States because the 
credibility of ~uch a &reve threat is open to chcllenr,e on 
lower level conflicts. 
4. World public opinion is opposed to the introduc-
tion of nuclear \·;ea pons into either policy or actua 1 con-
flict. 
5. Crossing the nuclear threshold is provocative, 
to say the least, and invites horrible retalfation. 
3. Stratecic Options and National Goals 
To implement any nationel stratesy the appropriate 
military forces cust bo developed ond maintained. To a 
t;reat extent the nature and flexibility of r.iili tary forces 
available influences the military options hence the stra-
tegic options of a nation. No single stratef·y or military 
option can achieve ell of our national objectives. Nor 
can ne or any nation afford all of the stratecies. Hence 
there is what Dr. KissinGer called the necessity of choice 
to determine what coals \Ye will pursue imd wbot r.ieans v:e 
Yrlll use. 
In order to rationally choose a~onf the many 
stretcgic options we have divided the possibili ties into 
three general areas: 
A. r.~ilitery options for the ir.1plement~tion Of 
denial strEte~ies 
B. Uili ta.ry options for the inple r::entation of 
punishment strateBies 
11 
) c. ~.iili tary opt:ions for the irnpleruenta tion of 
nixed strategies 
The listing of options will be treated in terms of force 
requre~ent since force levels in existence deternine the 
options. 
aro: 
The options within the denial.strotegy category are: 
1. lai"'ge genera l purpose forces (without nuclear 
\'1eapons) (LGPF) 
2. r.iedium f_;encral purpose forces (specializing in 
sealift and a irlift capabilities) (J,:GPF) 
3. collective security alliance (without nucle ar 
woapons)(CSA ) 
4. mediu.":l General purpose fo recs •;:i th very lim-
i tcd tactical nucle~r \•:eDponc (~:G PF-N) 
The options with.in the punishr.:ent strateGY catoc ory 
1. pri1::ary reliance on nuclear \-:enpons ccploycd 
with city-snaring strategy, i.e. tarGeted 
against enemy military tarr;ets, but not those 
in cities. This strategy Eives high priority 
to l'::eeping civilian c:estruction et a minir.1U:~. 
(C-S) 
2. primary reliance on nuclear weapons deployed 
with count e:rfcrce str.a te r::y, i.e. t arce t i ng 
enemy cilit&ry tar~ets regardless of civil!an 
) damage c.inir.ial conventiomil forces (CF) 
3. pri~ary reliance ~n nuclear ~e c~ons deployed 





encray civilinn centers and value laden objects. 
Minimal conventionnl forces (CV) 
reliance on total nuclear weapons deployed as 
an all-out n&ssive r~taliation or spasm 
nuclear resoonse a£ainst the ene~y (Spasm) 
5. doo~sday strate~y of automatic release of total 
destructive capacity upon being attacked. The 
ultimate ueaponJ destroying mankind (DooQ) 
Betv1een these tv:o categories are the 1iiixed strategies 
which enploy both conventional and nuclcsr ~eapons. Their 
pri1:mry dravrbocks for the United States are political: i.e. 
they are expensive requiring both conventional forces end n 
total range from tactical to ~assive stratecic nuclear 
y,reo.pons. 'lhe e;.:pcnse is on-r,oi~ in convcr..t iono.l f'o1~ce 
naintenance and reseerch and devolop~ent of new nuclear 
•;1eepons. The econor.iy c r- n produce it, but the question is 
one of priorities. Lont.; -termJ or 11 peace-ti~e" defense 
spending is unpopular 2.11d therefore politically difficult. 
These policies c.lso have the disadventage of beir..g complex, 
i.e. of not providing the simple solution the Amerlcan 
people lo11g for. 
The options in the ~ixed strategy category are: 
l. Deliberate, selective, controlled response 
(D.S.C.) requires rJe<liur.1 conventional forces 
~ith sealif't and airlift capabi~ities and a 
total srect11u~ of nuclear \·!eapons. This is 
similar to Kennedy's flexible response. 
2. Euclcrr sh:· 11 i1:'°; fo:'ce ~ir.:.il£-r to the t'r ~ ::e11t 
NATO alliance but eiving severei nations control 
over nuclear neapons (another similar structure 
was the MLF, t.!ul ti-Lateral Force). There i'iOUld 
also be conventional forces ~·:i th tactical 
nuclear '.':eapons. (lrsF) 
In order to f'acilitnte co~parison and analysis we 
have arranscd the above milit~ry options in order from 
total reliance on conventional forces (deniel strategies) 
to total reliance on nuclear forces (punishment strategies). 
This ordering also represents the progressive gravity of 
the \':es.pons sys terns. 
Military Options 
1. larGe scncral purpose forces 
2. ne<lium General purpose forces (sea end 
airlift 
3. collective security alliance 
4. mediUl:l. General purpose forces (\·iith tac-
tical nuclear) 
5. deliberate, selective controlled response 
6. nuclear sha1•ing force 
7. city-sparing strategy 
8. counterforce strategy 
9. countervalue strategy 
10. spasm nuclear response . 













Possible costs in the form of risks increase as 
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one goes dovm the scal e (1-11). Costs in tern s of economic-
financial reeourcos and political and social control tend to 
decrc~se as one Goes do~~ the scele (1-11). Thus an optinum 
stra tet;y nust be the result of trade-offs in \'.'hich certain 
levels of cost and risk are balanced in some kind of accept-
T (J.!,r'5 6) able policy. hcoretically tho nixed stratofies - and 
provide the best ~ethod to balance cost and risk end yet 
provide fll::-:ibility and ~ecuritJ. 
An adequate deterrence strategy be it by deninl, 
punishnent or a mixture of both should have certain impor-
tant policy characteris t ics . It nust be feasible, i.e. it 
must be technoloEically and politically possible. These 
nre two very different kinds of feasibility and so must be 
treated differently. It must be credibl e, i.e. the enemy 
must believe you will actually carry out your t hr e a t if 
they cDrr:r out their plans or they will not be deterred. 
Different levels of threat 3pply to different levels of 
at;g1,ession . There.fore we have designated "credibility 
major 11 to refer to major or large-scale aggression and 
11 credibility minor'' to be applicable to niinor aE;e:rcss ion. 
' . 
Thtts r:1assive nuclear retaliation might be 11 credible ma jor'' 
but is not "credible minor. 11 It nus t be suz•v iv able, i.e. 
your retaliatory \1eapons r.mst be o.ble to survive e. suc-
cessful enemy first strike. It must be rcliablo, i . e. 
the systec employed oust be able to achieve the destruc-
tion plarmed. It nust be flexible, i.e. multiple options 
exist to allow for E'.ppropriate response to ene1:1y action. 
12 
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It must be ccono~ic al, i.e. within the cost-range the A~er­
ican public and Congress \':ill tolerate. It r.rust bo suffi-
cient, i.e. provide a threat great enough to aeter t he onemy. 
And it must be non-orovoca ti ve, i.e. cleorly defensiv.e in 
nature so as not to itself provoke n5£ression or esculu-
tion.23 These attributes, while all desir a ble, vary in 
importance so may also be ranked: 
Policy Attributes 
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While the ranking is sor.1ev.·hat subjective it is believed thot 
it could be defended on logi cal grounds. HO\·:ever it is also 
recognized that the ranking does not rest upon hard evicence. 
Thus .far \"te have described certain key elements in the 
analysis o.f deterrence theory. We have defined th!"ee r:;en-
eral ways to deter, denial, punish~ent, and mixed stratesies. 
23Hitch and J.IcKeon, op. cit., pp. 333-357. 
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We hi-ive looked at some of the costs, constraints, nnd risks 
involved in [.:ny choice. ','Je now come to the point of decid-
ing among them. 
One ~ould usually oeasure the effectiveness of a 
progra~ by assessing its success in achieving its objec-
tive aBainst the cost and risk involved. However at the 
onset of the present problem r:e find that many stra tee-ic 
-options run counter to the stated conls. For _oxar.1ple a 
total nuclear war, or a purely countervalue strategy, or 
a doomsday machine produces the very thing we wish to 
prevent. If one is serious about the objective of savins 
lives one catmot rationally opt for a spD.sr.i. nuclear wa.r. 
In order to lir.tl.t the ranc;e of strateE_:ios the pol-
icy c aker ~rust consider, we have conztructed a matrix 
which ot tempts to shm·1 the incomµat i bili ty of certain 
strateg ic options with stated conls. The strategies, 
from table II, are arrnnsed on the horizontal sxis begin-
ning with conventionel -.·;ea.pons sys teM s trn te[;'ie s end rJov-
ing on to nuclear and finally total nuclear strategies. 
They ranGe from one to eleven. Cor:ibining the e;oals in 
table I and the desired attributes of strategy in table 
III we have the tv;enty-three i terns of the goal/attribute 
axis of the r.1atrix. 
From the oatrix it is claer that either extre~e 
of the ranr;e of stra teg:ic options is not ace~ pt able. 
\'Jhile a doomsday machine ~ould be technolorically fees-
ible and economical it '\':oulc be inco1:.patible with the 
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From the matrix it is clear thct either extre~::e of 
the rang·e of stro. tec;ic options is not acceptable~ ·~-raile a 
doorasC. ey nachine v1oul d be te ch..l"lolot:;ic G:lly feasible and e co-
nomic6l it would be incorapat ~ ble ~ith the pr ~tection or 
r.iainte nancc of America n interests. On the othei~ hand, lar6e 
general purpo~e forc e s whi le non-provocptive are neither 
politically feas i ble nor econ oraical nor do they offer any 
reveals that ~ost of the stre teEies are incocpatible with 
at least sone stated national t;oals. Furtl~er t.'e see there 
are no strate Gics in pe rfe ct nccord "."lith oll the r;onJ.s. 
Assur.lil"Lg that all goals a.re equal (v:hich they are not) we 
can choose strutcsics t ha; t are in best r;enornl accord with 
the stQted c oals. Using this sor.;cY.'h:.:.t subjoct.i ve r.1ethod 
we .fine the follor:int; three strategies are the most cor.tp~t-
ible: 
1. J'5 StratCGY 7f : Deliberate, Se lective, and Con-
trolled Reoponse strateGies 
2. Strategy fl6: Nucle ur Sharing Force or Colle c-
tive Security and Alliance Systems nith lin-
ited nuclear weapons 
). Strategy 7f7: Total Nuclear Force vlith City-
Sparillb L:-:iployt:cnt st1,ategies 
It should be e:phasized that this catrix has been 
constructeci for heuristic purposes. It is r.!eant to ce::1on-
. s tra.te the fc asibili ty of enplo;rins rational C.ecis ion r.:E.kir.g 
tecr.:niques in n o..tional securi t-:,~ polic-y. Th1.s p~rticulE.1~ 
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rankins of goals and jueg~ent of co~patibility are tent~tive 
and SUGGOstive rather than authoritative. Such a Matriz 
could well be constructed using the "Delphi Tcch.."lique 11 of' 
correls.tin~ rankings requested from perhe.ps 100 leodinc men 
in the nutional security field. A ~1:ore accurate picture of' 
compatibility could also be gained b~ scalir~ cowpatibility 
f'rom - l.O··-j + 1.0 instead of using either/or carl~ings. 
1:cte: A r.-.ct:-:oc~ ~ci· t~_!3inL: tr~C' :'•:st~lts c:' t!-".- ·.:.; I.'.. : : :-.;_ 
Tc c ~~~quc nn~ el~ 1~nt~ry f~ ci=i~~~ t~~ ~r; to fi~d t~: b.~~ 
stroteGJ is pre!Jcntcd in ~ppendix II. 
12E 
Appendix II 
What follows is an a ttempt to develop a nethodology 
to deternine the best choice econg several strategic 
options given certnin goals. '.rhis underta!dng is te:nta-
tive and is not yet backed up ~ith field research. It is 
presented here as n pos s iule method to be included in the 
study. 
In order to prepare the data for analysis \·,·e will 
di vidc the not:t onal goals i nto thre e setsJ Prevention, 
Protection, and l:lainte nancc: 
A. Prevention Set 
4 (1) Spasr.lodic t~uclear rtar 
1 (2) Controlled I·Iuclear War 
2 (3) Nuclear City Atta.ck 
1 C4l Counterve.lue Salvo 
B. Protection Set 
4 (1) Anerican Population 
1 (2) American Territory 
1 (3) Political and Econo~ic Syste!:! 
2 <4> 1:ilitary end ilili t~ry Support System 
l (5) Value Syster.i 
12' 
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c. r.!aintenanco Sot 
4 (1) lTATO Alliance 
2 (2) OAS S:ts tett 
2 (3) j.iiddle East Bal a nce of' Po·.•1er 
l <4> Status ~uo i n Af rica and the Indi t?n Sub continent 
2 (5) Asian Balance of Poi·1er 
We may now calculate pref'erence r anki nf; s a r.1ong t: .e 
three best stratcsies a~ they relate to en.ch ~f the policy 
goal sets. Arriving at preference ranking s is another 
step in Y1hich the Delphi Technique could be utilized to 
advante.c;e. 
In the following t ables strategy # 1 is the l'~ucloar 
Shoring force; stratery #2 is City-Sparin~ strntc&y; 








































































Another variable to be considered is the utility 
vHlue oi' stN~tot;ies 1, 2, artd 3. ""Spcci.fically, we are rank ... 
inG the utility of e ~ ch strate£y in achieving each policy 
goal. Vihereas the preference ranking compared stratec;ies 
with each other, utility rankings are cletcrminntions of the 
value of each strateGY in achieving each goal. The utility 
value is measured on e scale from 0.0 to 1.0: 
Uti iity Rankir£ (Scale 0 - 1.00) 
Prevention Set 
1 2 3 4 
1 .6 .6 .2 .2 
2 .8 .8 .9 .99 
3 . .7 .7 . .s .9 
~rotection Set 
1 2 3 4 5 
l .2 .3 .2 .8 .2 
2 .9 .5 .01 .001 .8 




1 2 3 4 
l .95 .95 .95 .7 .9 
2 .8 .3 .2 .3 .2-
3 .7 .4 .6 .3 .5 
One can also rank the probability or one strategy 
·· securing o. r;iven- t~ oal 01• C>bjc.:ctive. These probabilities 
are E;iven in rans es tha.t ere sonev:hat subjective, however 
they are also related to solid empirical resea rch in some 
cases and/or logic in other cases. For the purposes or 
this eomonstration that is sufficient. The probability 
ro.nkinss are as follo\·1s. The scale O. 0 - l. 0 is used. 
Probnb il 5. t y Rnn~: -t;r.g 
Prevention Sot 
l 2 3 4 
l C.4 - .7) C..5 - • 7) (.2 - .5) ( .2 - • .5) 
2 ( .8 - • 95 )(. 6 - .8) (. 9 - • 95 )(. 7 - .9) 
3 (.7 - .85)(.8 - .9) (.8 - .9) (. 9 - .95) 
Protection Set 
1 2 3 4 5 
l C.5 - .7) ( .6 - • 8) ( .5 - .6) (.1 - .2) ( .1 - .2) 
2 (. 7 - .9) ( .1 - .4) (. 7 - .9) (. 01 - • 3 ) ( • 9 - • 95) 
3 (. 9 - • 95} (. 9 - .9,5)(.9 - • 95) (.5 - • 7) ( .5 - .8) 
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I.faint cnnnc o Set 
1 2 3 4 
1 (. 9 - • 95) (. 6 - • 85) (. 8 - .. 9) (. 6 - .7) ( .8 - .9) 
2 (. 7 
-
.o ) ( .5 
-
• 7) (. 7 - • 8) (.4 - 06) ( .5 - .6) 
3 (. 6 - .8) (. 3 - .. 5) <.5 - • 6) (. 3 - .5) (. 2 - .3) 
Further, in order to cc.mt:>le t.c our r c.nki11g prooezs 
we can construct a b ounded expected util i ty !'Ul:lcinG. 1ro clo 
thi.s it is ncces:::ary to Yiei~ht tho pclic:f goa l r. c ts by thoil• 
ir.lportanc~. Thi~ r t!n1~h~g is the product of util i ty 2nd 

















B , ' E . , T·. • , • .... 'O 1 . OU~OCti 'XDCC~CQ u~ 1 -l ~ J ~~ncing 
Prevention Set (3) 
1(3) 2(1) 3(1) 4c1 > 
1 I C.24 - .]+2) {.30 - .42) (.04 - .10) (.04 - .10) .16 - .28 
2 I c.64 - .16> <.48 - .64> (.8:.. - .a5s>c.69 - .90> • 67 - . 79 
3 l (. h ~ - . 5 9 5 ) ( • 5 6 - . 6 3 ). ( • 4 o - • 45 ) ( . G l - • G 5 5 ) • 2 2 - . 60 
• .Prot0cti~n 3et (2) 
l (3) 2(1) 3(1) 4(2) 5(1) 
{. lo - . i4 ) C • 1 o - . 24 ) <. 1 o - . 16 ) C • c8 - • i 6 ) ( • ~2 - . 04 ) .10 - _._15 
(.63 - .ul) {.05 - .20) (. GCj- .. 009) (.00 001 - (. 7 2 - .76) 
_._33 - .hJ 
.0003 ) 
(. 7 2 - • 7 6 ) ( • 01 - • D 5 5 )( • 7 2 - • 7 6 ) ( • 2 o - • 2 0 ) (. 3 O - • 48 ) ~5 - .62 
~~intonunco Se t (1) 
1 (3) 2(2) ~'2' ..) \ I 4(1) 5(2) 
(.!355-. 90) C.57 - . 807)(.76 - .355)(.42 - .49) (.72 - .Gl) • 71 - .81 
L56 - .64) C.15 - .21) (. lI:. - .16) (.12 - .18) ( .. 10 - .12) _.26_-_.Jl 
C.42 - .56) (.12 - .20) (. J O - .36) (.09 - .15) (.10 - .15) . 2L~ -_._33 
1-' 
w 
I~1 ouch set above the fif t h and unde1•linod colur.m 
rcprc~ents the ;rnichtcd bounc~cl c:r.pectcd utility of each 
strntOGJ ~ithin each ~oLl set. For this it was necessary 
are in pnrenthc ses n c.:r.t to the c;oal nu:-:'t·f.l:rs. 
The final stop is t o co;.ip~.ra strutet;ies not only 
~ithin eech Goal set, ns &bove, but in r elation t o nll 
es uell. Theso ueights nppear in parentheses next to the 
goal sot. The i•esul t :l.s the v:e5.Ghtcd bounded ox ;:rnctcd 
utility b ... 
" 
strc. tegy and [.;OE.l set: 
Stratc:ry 1 .22 
- .32 
Strntegy 2 .52 
-
. 62 
Strc=.tcry 3 . lt9 - .55 
Tl~c choice nr.:cnb t he se t !·:roo i.: r.:~dc clc!.!r .:-.r by 
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Usinc; tho concopt cf minli:!a:X rcc;rct it becomes clear 
that the optimal strategy is //2 or a nuclcnx· force ·1:ith a 
city-spar int; c::iplo y:.~ont. 
It is ngnin to be strosDcd that the foregoing is 
nercly a ~e~onstration of the contribution cert:in quan-
ti tutivo techniques can 1-:::a ke in i~at:tono.l decision n:akine;. 
I do not present thane fi~urcs nnd ~eights, etc., as 
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